SOMALIA – CONFLICT & FAMINE – GENDER
by International Crisis Group, 11 May 2017.
Waiting for food aid distribution in
Somalia
Somalia
Overview
History is at risk of tragically repeating itself. Once
again, conflict-wracked Somalia is faced with mass hunger, just six years after
a man-made famine took the lives of 250,000 people, mostly children, and 25
years after another killed 300,000, triggering a U.S. and UN intervention
without which many more would have perished. An estimated 6.2 million people – half
the country’s population – are in dire need; over three million are in a “crisis”
or “emergency” situation, faced with death due to hunger and disease. While
governmental and international responses have been relatively swift and relief
efforts better coordinated (in part, because of lessons learned from the 2011
famine), many former limitations and challenges remain. Today, Somalis are
starving because funding is insufficient and because access denial and
insecurity impede delivery; most of all, they are starving because chronic
conflict has destroyed their savings and ability to cope with periodic drought.
The government and its international partners must tackle these immediate
impediments and do more to stabilise the country lest yet another famine loom
in the not-too-distant future.
again, conflict-wracked Somalia is faced with mass hunger, just six years after
a man-made famine took the lives of 250,000 people, mostly children, and 25
years after another killed 300,000, triggering a U.S. and UN intervention
without which many more would have perished. An estimated 6.2 million people – half
the country’s population – are in dire need; over three million are in a “crisis”
or “emergency” situation, faced with death due to hunger and disease. While
governmental and international responses have been relatively swift and relief
efforts better coordinated (in part, because of lessons learned from the 2011
famine), many former limitations and challenges remain. Today, Somalis are
starving because funding is insufficient and because access denial and
insecurity impede delivery; most of all, they are starving because chronic
conflict has destroyed their savings and ability to cope with periodic drought.
The government and its international partners must tackle these immediate
impediments and do more to stabilise the country lest yet another famine loom
in the not-too-distant future.
As in 2011, the epicentre of the current humanitarian
crisis is south-central Somalia where Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist
insurgency, and localised clan conflicts have compounded the drought’s impact,
undermined subsistence farming and cereal production, and led to crippling
inflation and skyrocketing food prices, as well as mass displacement. Pockets
in northern Puntland and Somaliland have also been badly hit, though the
situation is far less grim than in the south.
crisis is south-central Somalia where Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist
insurgency, and localised clan conflicts have compounded the drought’s impact,
undermined subsistence farming and cereal production, and led to crippling
inflation and skyrocketing food prices, as well as mass displacement. Pockets
in northern Puntland and Somaliland have also been badly hit, though the
situation is far less grim than in the south.
Greater international assistance is urgently needed but
will not be enough. A central cause of the crisis is access restrictions,
provoked all at once by Al-Shabaab-orchestrated violence and insecurity,
increased numbers of checkpoints on major aid supply routes, bureaucratic impediments
and hefty illicit fees that both limit reach and increase delivery costs.
Muslim community leaders and clerics should seek to persuade Al-Shabaab to
allow access to areas under its control. But access restrictions are also the
work of clan militias and disgruntled government and federal state forces
engaging in predatory behaviour and routinely erecting barriers on major
highways to extort money. The federal government and federal member states
need, therefore, to pressure them too: through negotiations with clan militias
if feasible, by considering military options to dismantle the checkpoints and
provide armed escorts to relief convoys if necessary. And the federal
government and federal member states should ease official impediments and red tape,
which further constrain access. With a massive number of vulnerable people on
the move in remote areas, the federal government and federal member states will
need to do more to assist them and, in particular, curb rampant sexual violence
in displaced peoples’ camps. These are all important steps, but to get beyond
palliatives and find a more sustainable solution, the government will need to
tackle the conflict itself, which remains the principal trigger and contributor
to this unfolding humanitarian catastrophe: by improving governance; taking
steps to address the division of power and resources among the central
government and member states in a permanent constitution; and promoting
countrywide clan reconciliation.
will not be enough. A central cause of the crisis is access restrictions,
provoked all at once by Al-Shabaab-orchestrated violence and insecurity,
increased numbers of checkpoints on major aid supply routes, bureaucratic impediments
and hefty illicit fees that both limit reach and increase delivery costs.
Muslim community leaders and clerics should seek to persuade Al-Shabaab to
allow access to areas under its control. But access restrictions are also the
work of clan militias and disgruntled government and federal state forces
engaging in predatory behaviour and routinely erecting barriers on major
highways to extort money. The federal government and federal member states
need, therefore, to pressure them too: through negotiations with clan militias
if feasible, by considering military options to dismantle the checkpoints and
provide armed escorts to relief convoys if necessary. And the federal
government and federal member states should ease official impediments and red tape,
which further constrain access. With a massive number of vulnerable people on
the move in remote areas, the federal government and federal member states will
need to do more to assist them and, in particular, curb rampant sexual violence
in displaced peoples’ camps. These are all important steps, but to get beyond
palliatives and find a more sustainable solution, the government will need to
tackle the conflict itself, which remains the principal trigger and contributor
to this unfolding humanitarian catastrophe: by improving governance; taking
steps to address the division of power and resources among the central
government and member states in a permanent constitution; and promoting
countrywide clan reconciliation.
Conflict, Drought, Displacement, Access
Denial and Hunger
Denial and Hunger
A. An Acute Humanitarian Crisis
Since the central state’s collapse in 1991, Somalia has
been wracked by acute humanitarian crises of varying intensity and experienced
two major famines – in 1992-1993 and 2011-2012. A combination of protracted
armed conflict and climatic as well as environmental stresses has made the
country highly vulnerable to periodic large-scale famine.[fn]Crisis
Group has been writing about Somalia since 2002. See for example, Crisis Group
Africa Reports N°170, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, 21
February 2011; N°147, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, 23 December
2008; N°116, Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, 10 August 2006; Crisis
Group Africa Briefings N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, 26 June 2014;
N°87, Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed, 22
February 2012; Commentaries, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out”, 27 June 2016; “Somalia:
Why is Al-Shabaab Still A Potent Threat?”, 11 February 2016.
been wracked by acute humanitarian crises of varying intensity and experienced
two major famines – in 1992-1993 and 2011-2012. A combination of protracted
armed conflict and climatic as well as environmental stresses has made the
country highly vulnerable to periodic large-scale famine.[fn]Crisis
Group has been writing about Somalia since 2002. See for example, Crisis Group
Africa Reports N°170, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, 21
February 2011; N°147, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, 23 December
2008; N°116, Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, 10 August 2006; Crisis
Group Africa Briefings N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, 26 June 2014;
N°87, Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed, 22
February 2012; Commentaries, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out”, 27 June 2016; “Somalia:
Why is Al-Shabaab Still A Potent Threat?”, 11 February 2016.
The immediate cause of the current crisis is extensive
and prolonged drought provoked by two consecutive years of failed Deyr (October-December)
and Gu (April-June) rains. This triggered a humanitarian catastrophe on
a scale unprecedented since 2011. Subsistence farming in the Shabelle and Juba
river valleys has all but collapsed;[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA), 23 April 2017.Hide Footnote prices of
staple grains and legumes (maize, sorghum and beans) have doubled;[fn]“Somalia
Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, ibid.Hide Footnote
and millions of livestock have perished. Deforestation (partly fuelled by
the charcoal trade), soil erosion, coupled with diminishing volumes of water in
the three major rivers – Shabelle, Janale and Juba – in turn have severely
undermined subsistence farming in the fertile riverine belts. Somalis also
blame insufficient local production of traditional coarse grains on land
grabbing by businessmen connected to powerful clans and the switch to cash
crops, such as lemons and sesame seed, especially in Lower Shabelle.[fn]Crisis
Group telephone interview, agronomist based in Kismayo, April 2017. For
background, see Catherine Besteman and Lee Casanelli, The Struggle for Land
in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War (London, 2003).
and prolonged drought provoked by two consecutive years of failed Deyr (October-December)
and Gu (April-June) rains. This triggered a humanitarian catastrophe on
a scale unprecedented since 2011. Subsistence farming in the Shabelle and Juba
river valleys has all but collapsed;[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA), 23 April 2017.Hide Footnote prices of
staple grains and legumes (maize, sorghum and beans) have doubled;[fn]“Somalia
Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, ibid.Hide Footnote
and millions of livestock have perished. Deforestation (partly fuelled by
the charcoal trade), soil erosion, coupled with diminishing volumes of water in
the three major rivers – Shabelle, Janale and Juba – in turn have severely
undermined subsistence farming in the fertile riverine belts. Somalis also
blame insufficient local production of traditional coarse grains on land
grabbing by businessmen connected to powerful clans and the switch to cash
crops, such as lemons and sesame seed, especially in Lower Shabelle.[fn]Crisis
Group telephone interview, agronomist based in Kismayo, April 2017. For
background, see Catherine Besteman and Lee Casanelli, The Struggle for Land
in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War (London, 2003).
In many urban centres in south-central Somalia food is
increasingly scarce and available only at prices internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and the very poor simply cannot afford. In an effort not to further
undermine the regional market (with free relief food that disincentives farmers
from planting more crops), and because it is more efficient, a number of aid
agencies, among them USAID, UKAid and ACF (Action Contre la Faim) are sending
small sums of money directly to needy families via mobile phones.[fn]In
addition to avoiding market distortion via massive amounts of free, imported
food, aid agencies have learned that small cash transfers are cheaper than
trucking in large quantities of supplies and – under the right conditions – produce
less diversion (or theft) of assistance. Crisis Group telephone interview,
former U.S. government official, 2 May 2017. For more, see “Final Evaluation of
the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern
and Central Somalia”, UNICEF and Humanitarian Outcomes, 2013.
increasingly scarce and available only at prices internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and the very poor simply cannot afford. In an effort not to further
undermine the regional market (with free relief food that disincentives farmers
from planting more crops), and because it is more efficient, a number of aid
agencies, among them USAID, UKAid and ACF (Action Contre la Faim) are sending
small sums of money directly to needy families via mobile phones.[fn]In
addition to avoiding market distortion via massive amounts of free, imported
food, aid agencies have learned that small cash transfers are cheaper than
trucking in large quantities of supplies and – under the right conditions – produce
less diversion (or theft) of assistance. Crisis Group telephone interview,
former U.S. government official, 2 May 2017. For more, see “Final Evaluation of
the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern
and Central Somalia”, UNICEF and Humanitarian Outcomes, 2013.
The drought situation is not about to improve. Despite
the onset of Gu rains in April in some parts of Somalia, experts predict
the prolonged dry spell will persist.[fn]The Famine Early Warning
System Network (FEWS NET) noted in its latest global weather forecast update
that Somalia experienced generally low, erratic and below average rainfall,
adding that the situation was unlikely to improve. “Global Weather Hazards
Summary”, Fews Net, 14-20 April 2017.Hide Footnote
Some 6.2 million people are in dire need of assistance and nearly 600,000
have been displaced since November 2016.[fn]UNOCHA estimates that
2.9 million are in dire “emergency” and “crisis” situations; 3.3 million in “stressed
food security and livelihood situations”; and 363,000 children in a state of “acute
malnutrition”. “Operational Plan for Prevention of Famine in Somalia”, UNOCHA,
February 2017; “Somalia Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote The bulk live in makeshift camps in Baidoa
and Mogadishu and are increasingly desperate. Overcrowding and poor sanitation
incubates infectious diseases like cholera and measles. In some of the camps, “gatekeepers”
masquerading as “camp elders” are beginning to obstruct aid deliveries and
extort bribes. Hundreds of thousands of victims of previous displacements also
live precariously in cities and bigger towns.
the onset of Gu rains in April in some parts of Somalia, experts predict
the prolonged dry spell will persist.[fn]The Famine Early Warning
System Network (FEWS NET) noted in its latest global weather forecast update
that Somalia experienced generally low, erratic and below average rainfall,
adding that the situation was unlikely to improve. “Global Weather Hazards
Summary”, Fews Net, 14-20 April 2017.Hide Footnote
Some 6.2 million people are in dire need of assistance and nearly 600,000
have been displaced since November 2016.[fn]UNOCHA estimates that
2.9 million are in dire “emergency” and “crisis” situations; 3.3 million in “stressed
food security and livelihood situations”; and 363,000 children in a state of “acute
malnutrition”. “Operational Plan for Prevention of Famine in Somalia”, UNOCHA,
February 2017; “Somalia Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote The bulk live in makeshift camps in Baidoa
and Mogadishu and are increasingly desperate. Overcrowding and poor sanitation
incubates infectious diseases like cholera and measles. In some of the camps, “gatekeepers”
masquerading as “camp elders” are beginning to obstruct aid deliveries and
extort bribes. Hundreds of thousands of victims of previous displacements also
live precariously in cities and bigger towns.
What stands in the way of a more effective and
sustainable response to this humanitarian emergency are not acts of God or of
nature. It is the intractable conflict that Somalia has experienced since the
early 1990s. True, aid agencies are now able to reach close to two million
vulnerable people. But they continue to face enormous challenges in meeting their
target of reaching 5.5 million, because many areas are inaccessible and
insecure.
sustainable response to this humanitarian emergency are not acts of God or of
nature. It is the intractable conflict that Somalia has experienced since the
early 1990s. True, aid agencies are now able to reach close to two million
vulnerable people. But they continue to face enormous challenges in meeting their
target of reaching 5.5 million, because many areas are inaccessible and
insecure.
B. Al-Shabaab Checkpoints and Access Denial
Al-Shabaab maintains an active military presence in much
of the south’s drought-stricken countryside, and its violence and other
destabilising activities constitute the greatest impediment to the delivery of
relief to drought victims. The group routinely launches deadly assaults on
troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somalia Federal
Government (SFG) and federal member states; runs “security checkpoints” on
major routes;[fn]According to the UN, the most affected roads are
Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow, Mogadishu-Afgooye-Marka-Barawe-Kismayo and
Mogadishu-Balcad-Jowhar-Belet Weyne-Galkacyo. Al-Shabaab is not the only armed
group to erect roadblocks in order to extort money from drivers. Clan militias
and government soldiers also routinely engage in this behaviour. “Somalia
Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, op. cit. “WFP probes bomb attack on
its convoy in Somalia”, Xinhua, 17 April 2017; “Aid worker kidnaps and
roadblocks soar in famine-threatened Somalia”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 4
May 2017.Hide Footnote and uses a variety of
coercive tactics to prevent people from leaving and block access to aid
agencies.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefings N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, 26 June 2014; N°74, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010; Africa Reports
N°100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005; N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11
July 2005; N°45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May
2002.
of the south’s drought-stricken countryside, and its violence and other
destabilising activities constitute the greatest impediment to the delivery of
relief to drought victims. The group routinely launches deadly assaults on
troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somalia Federal
Government (SFG) and federal member states; runs “security checkpoints” on
major routes;[fn]According to the UN, the most affected roads are
Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow, Mogadishu-Afgooye-Marka-Barawe-Kismayo and
Mogadishu-Balcad-Jowhar-Belet Weyne-Galkacyo. Al-Shabaab is not the only armed
group to erect roadblocks in order to extort money from drivers. Clan militias
and government soldiers also routinely engage in this behaviour. “Somalia
Drought Response: Situational Report No.5”, op. cit. “WFP probes bomb attack on
its convoy in Somalia”, Xinhua, 17 April 2017; “Aid worker kidnaps and
roadblocks soar in famine-threatened Somalia”, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 4
May 2017.Hide Footnote and uses a variety of
coercive tactics to prevent people from leaving and block access to aid
agencies.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefings N°99, Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War, 26 June 2014; N°74, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, 18 May 2010; Africa Reports
N°100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005; N°95, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, 11
July 2005; N°45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May
2002.
Al-Shabaab’s complex and fraught relationship with
humanitarian agencies operating in south-central Somalia was not always
hostile. Prior to the 2011 famine, a few of its top commanders, notably Mukhtar
Robow, cultivated cordial ties with relief agencies, granted them limited
access after payment of “fees” and used their influence to secure release of
abducted aid workers.[fn]“Somalia’s hardline Islamists invite aid
groups”, Agence France-Presse, 29 March 2009.
humanitarian agencies operating in south-central Somalia was not always
hostile. Prior to the 2011 famine, a few of its top commanders, notably Mukhtar
Robow, cultivated cordial ties with relief agencies, granted them limited
access after payment of “fees” and used their influence to secure release of
abducted aid workers.[fn]“Somalia’s hardline Islamists invite aid
groups”, Agence France-Presse, 29 March 2009.
But the 2011 famine coincided with two significant
setbacks for Al-Shabaab: first, a major AMISOM offensive as a result of which
the movement lost key urban strongholds in rapid succession; second, increased
U.S. attacks using drones and special operations forces targeting its top
leadership. An increasingly paranoid Al-Shabaab severed links to relief
agencies and banned foreign aid agencies and their local partners from its
territory, accusing them of espionage.[fn]This coincided with
revelations that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had sought to use a polio
vaccination campaign in Pakistan to identify the location of Osama bin Laden’s
hideout. “CIA organised fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden’s family
DNA”, The Guardian, 11 July 2011.Hide Footnote
setbacks for Al-Shabaab: first, a major AMISOM offensive as a result of which
the movement lost key urban strongholds in rapid succession; second, increased
U.S. attacks using drones and special operations forces targeting its top
leadership. An increasingly paranoid Al-Shabaab severed links to relief
agencies and banned foreign aid agencies and their local partners from its
territory, accusing them of espionage.[fn]This coincided with
revelations that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had sought to use a polio
vaccination campaign in Pakistan to identify the location of Osama bin Laden’s
hideout. “CIA organised fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden’s family
DNA”, The Guardian, 11 July 2011.Hide Footnote
In February and March 2017, large numbers of
drought-stricken families began spontaneously leaving areas Al-Shabaab
controlled in Bay and Bakool, as well as the Shabelle and Juba river valleys in
search of relief assistance in federal and state government-controlled
territory. This raised speculation that the militant group might be softening
its uncompromising attitude toward foreign aid, perhaps because of the gravity
of the situation and criticism it endured when it blocked Western food aid
during the 2011 famine. These assumptions proved misplaced. Al-Shabaab blocked
the exodus through coercion and by providing its own relief to hungry
communities, arguably because of its heightened sense of insecurity and
vulnerability – a realisation that mass depopulation might expose it to aerial
and ground attacks.[fn]Crisis Group interview, prominent Somali
politician, Nairobi, 29 March 2017.
drought-stricken families began spontaneously leaving areas Al-Shabaab
controlled in Bay and Bakool, as well as the Shabelle and Juba river valleys in
search of relief assistance in federal and state government-controlled
territory. This raised speculation that the militant group might be softening
its uncompromising attitude toward foreign aid, perhaps because of the gravity
of the situation and criticism it endured when it blocked Western food aid
during the 2011 famine. These assumptions proved misplaced. Al-Shabaab blocked
the exodus through coercion and by providing its own relief to hungry
communities, arguably because of its heightened sense of insecurity and
vulnerability – a realisation that mass depopulation might expose it to aerial
and ground attacks.[fn]Crisis Group interview, prominent Somali
politician, Nairobi, 29 March 2017.
Today, Al-Shabaab continues to hold drought victims
hostage by blocking international organisations, the Somalia Federal Government
and local NGOs from delivering aid, even though territories under Al-Shabaab’s
control in south-central Somalia are among the most severely affected. Worse,
those found with Western-donated food and items risk arrest.[fn]Most
aid organisations label their donated supplies with their logos.Hide Footnote In one such incident in the town of Waajid
(Bay Region), in April, Al-Shabaab detained a group of people transporting
relief food on donkey carts, burned the food and issued an edict warning against
accepting handouts from “crusaders and apostates” (a reference to foreigners
and the Somali government).[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
The fate of those who were arrested remains unknown. But this incident,
together with an April improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a UN World
Food Programme (WFP) convoy in Mogadishu’s KM-3 district, suggests Al-Shabaab
may be intent on using violence to disrupt aid operations.[fn]“WFP probes
bomb attack on its convoy in Somalia”, Xinhua, 17 April 2017.
hostage by blocking international organisations, the Somalia Federal Government
and local NGOs from delivering aid, even though territories under Al-Shabaab’s
control in south-central Somalia are among the most severely affected. Worse,
those found with Western-donated food and items risk arrest.[fn]Most
aid organisations label their donated supplies with their logos.Hide Footnote In one such incident in the town of Waajid
(Bay Region), in April, Al-Shabaab detained a group of people transporting
relief food on donkey carts, burned the food and issued an edict warning against
accepting handouts from “crusaders and apostates” (a reference to foreigners
and the Somali government).[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
The fate of those who were arrested remains unknown. But this incident,
together with an April improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a UN World
Food Programme (WFP) convoy in Mogadishu’s KM-3 district, suggests Al-Shabaab
may be intent on using violence to disrupt aid operations.[fn]“WFP probes
bomb attack on its convoy in Somalia”, Xinhua, 17 April 2017.
Still, Al-Shabaab has sought to mollify critics and stem
the exodus of people fleeing hunger and water shortage in areas it controls. To
that end, it recently launched its own parallel relief effort to provide
livestock, food, water and even money – collected from compulsory donations
imposed on businesses and individuals across all Somali towns – to
drought-stricken Somalis.[fn]Among the coercive tactics used by
Al-Shabaab, especially in Juba and Lower Shabelle, is collection of the 2.5 per
cent zakat annual wealth tax and other levies. This, in the midst of a
terrible drought, has triggered public backlash and armed clashes. See “Al-Shabaab
seizes Somali herders’ livestock”, Voice of America, 26 December 2016.Hide Footnote But while its effectiveness is hard to
gauge, Al-Shabaab clearly could not single-handedly stave off such large-scale
famine and any speculation that the group may be amenable, through
negotiations, to open up areas under its control to aid agencies seems at the
very least premature. If anything, major military setbacks since 2011 and the
relentless U.S. drone campaign targeting its leadership have made the group
even more militant and suspicious of Western relief agencies.
the exodus of people fleeing hunger and water shortage in areas it controls. To
that end, it recently launched its own parallel relief effort to provide
livestock, food, water and even money – collected from compulsory donations
imposed on businesses and individuals across all Somali towns – to
drought-stricken Somalis.[fn]Among the coercive tactics used by
Al-Shabaab, especially in Juba and Lower Shabelle, is collection of the 2.5 per
cent zakat annual wealth tax and other levies. This, in the midst of a
terrible drought, has triggered public backlash and armed clashes. See “Al-Shabaab
seizes Somali herders’ livestock”, Voice of America, 26 December 2016.Hide Footnote But while its effectiveness is hard to
gauge, Al-Shabaab clearly could not single-handedly stave off such large-scale
famine and any speculation that the group may be amenable, through
negotiations, to open up areas under its control to aid agencies seems at the
very least premature. If anything, major military setbacks since 2011 and the
relentless U.S. drone campaign targeting its leadership have made the group
even more militant and suspicious of Western relief agencies.
Nor have expectations that Al-Shabaab might be more
charitable toward Muslim relief agencies been borne out. Its hostility
vis-à-vis international aid efforts no longer distinguishes between Western and
Muslim NGOs; the group deems Turkish and United Arab Emirates (UAE) personnel
and facilities legitimate targets.[fn]In one of the deadliest
attacks on Muslim relief workers, a Turkish Red Crescent aid convoy was
targeted by Al-Shabaab in April 2013; fifteen Somali aid workers and four Turks
were killed. Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a
State-Building in Progress”, SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and
Social Research), October 2014. In April, Al-Shabaab claimed an IED attack on
an Emirates Red Crescent aid convoy in Mogadishu. “Terror attack will not deter
UAE’s aid mission to Somalia”, The National (UAE), 19 April 2017.Hide Footnote As long as there is no dramatic
deterioration in the coming months and it can keep a lid on the hunger crisis
through its own parallel aid and coercion, and as long as no mass deaths occur
under its watch, Al-Shabaab will likely continue to rebuff calls for dialogue
to grant access to humanitarian agencies.
charitable toward Muslim relief agencies been borne out. Its hostility
vis-à-vis international aid efforts no longer distinguishes between Western and
Muslim NGOs; the group deems Turkish and United Arab Emirates (UAE) personnel
and facilities legitimate targets.[fn]In one of the deadliest
attacks on Muslim relief workers, a Turkish Red Crescent aid convoy was
targeted by Al-Shabaab in April 2013; fifteen Somali aid workers and four Turks
were killed. Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a
State-Building in Progress”, SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and
Social Research), October 2014. In April, Al-Shabaab claimed an IED attack on
an Emirates Red Crescent aid convoy in Mogadishu. “Terror attack will not deter
UAE’s aid mission to Somalia”, The National (UAE), 19 April 2017.Hide Footnote As long as there is no dramatic
deterioration in the coming months and it can keep a lid on the hunger crisis
through its own parallel aid and coercion, and as long as no mass deaths occur
under its watch, Al-Shabaab will likely continue to rebuff calls for dialogue
to grant access to humanitarian agencies.
C. Clan Conflicts: Insecurity, Checkpoints
and Access Denial
and Access Denial
Al-Shabaab is not the only non-state armed actor whose
actions have a direct impact on the humanitarian crisis. Parts of the country
remain trapped in unresolved inter-clan conflicts. These tensions are typically
exacerbated in times of drought when massive numbers of people and livestock
move across traditional clan “boundaries” in search of water and pasture.
Pre-existing clan disputes tend to resurface, sometimes resulting in sporadic,
low-level clashes among clan militias. This is particularly true in Sool and
Sanaag regions (northern Somalia) as well as Hiiraan, Galgadud, Mudug Lower and
Middle Shabelle in south-central Somalia. A series of clashes in the contested
town of Galkacyo in north-central Somalia in the last two years triggered a
massive displacement, with estimates ranging between 75,000 and 100,000, and a
humanitarian crisis.[fn]For more on this conflict see “Galkayo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines”, Crisis Group, 10
December 2015.
actions have a direct impact on the humanitarian crisis. Parts of the country
remain trapped in unresolved inter-clan conflicts. These tensions are typically
exacerbated in times of drought when massive numbers of people and livestock
move across traditional clan “boundaries” in search of water and pasture.
Pre-existing clan disputes tend to resurface, sometimes resulting in sporadic,
low-level clashes among clan militias. This is particularly true in Sool and
Sanaag regions (northern Somalia) as well as Hiiraan, Galgadud, Mudug Lower and
Middle Shabelle in south-central Somalia. A series of clashes in the contested
town of Galkacyo in north-central Somalia in the last two years triggered a
massive displacement, with estimates ranging between 75,000 and 100,000, and a
humanitarian crisis.[fn]For more on this conflict see “Galkayo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines”, Crisis Group, 10
December 2015.
Clan grievances and conflicts often occur in areas marked
by contested sub-national boundaries and in territories better endowed with
resources such as water and infrastructure (mostly roads, as well as airports
and harbours). In the past, traditional elders brokered temporary local truces
among warring clans. Some new federal member states have since reduced the
elders’ role in a bid to control local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts
(and to attract donor funding for such endeavours), but without replicating the
credible or effective mechanisms required to manage conflicts over resources,
especially water wells and reservoirs. In many instances, predatory/criminal
clan militias as well as rogue security elements belonging to the federal
states exploit these localised conflicts, erecting checkpoints on major routes
to serve as “toll stations” as a means of extracting money.[fn]See “Aid
worker kidnaps and roadblocks soar in famine-threatened Somalia”, Reuters, 4
May 2017. “The majority of the 42 districts in southern and central Somalia
continue to experience moderate to high movement restrictions linked to road
blockades, active hostilities and extortions at checkpoints”. “Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”, UNOCHA, 4 May 2017, p. 5. Some 40 static “illegal
taxation” checkpoints have been set up along the Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow access
road alone. On 13 April, over 60 trucks were stranded between Afgooye and Leego
towns for over a week after local authorities demanded large unjustified
payments. A similar incident involved over 30 trucks carrying supplies from
Bossaso port the previous week.
by contested sub-national boundaries and in territories better endowed with
resources such as water and infrastructure (mostly roads, as well as airports
and harbours). In the past, traditional elders brokered temporary local truces
among warring clans. Some new federal member states have since reduced the
elders’ role in a bid to control local reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts
(and to attract donor funding for such endeavours), but without replicating the
credible or effective mechanisms required to manage conflicts over resources,
especially water wells and reservoirs. In many instances, predatory/criminal
clan militias as well as rogue security elements belonging to the federal
states exploit these localised conflicts, erecting checkpoints on major routes
to serve as “toll stations” as a means of extracting money.[fn]See “Aid
worker kidnaps and roadblocks soar in famine-threatened Somalia”, Reuters, 4
May 2017. “The majority of the 42 districts in southern and central Somalia
continue to experience moderate to high movement restrictions linked to road
blockades, active hostilities and extortions at checkpoints”. “Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”, UNOCHA, 4 May 2017, p. 5. Some 40 static “illegal
taxation” checkpoints have been set up along the Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow access
road alone. On 13 April, over 60 trucks were stranded between Afgooye and Leego
towns for over a week after local authorities demanded large unjustified
payments. A similar incident involved over 30 trucks carrying supplies from
Bossaso port the previous week.
Preying on IDPs and Vulnerable Communities
Many Somali actors prey on IDPs and others who lack
protection from powerful clans, in effect profiting from conditions of acute
need and helping perpetuate them. These include in particular so-called leaders
who claim to represent needy communities as well as criminals. There is also a
genuine risk of exploitation by corrupt officials, although to date there has
been no credible report of corrupt practices related to the current relief
effort. At a minimum, the donor community should intensify its focus on Somali
anti-corruption institutions and civil society organisations. If leaders
suspected of corruption cannot be held accountable in Somalia, consideration
should be given to their being prosecuted by governments of countries in which
they hold dual citizenship.[fn]Many Somali elites possess dual
citizenship. For example, 124 of Somalia’s 283 MPs and Senators are from the
diaspora. President Farmajo is a U.S. citizen and previously worked for the New
York State government in Buffalo.
protection from powerful clans, in effect profiting from conditions of acute
need and helping perpetuate them. These include in particular so-called leaders
who claim to represent needy communities as well as criminals. There is also a
genuine risk of exploitation by corrupt officials, although to date there has
been no credible report of corrupt practices related to the current relief
effort. At a minimum, the donor community should intensify its focus on Somali
anti-corruption institutions and civil society organisations. If leaders
suspected of corruption cannot be held accountable in Somalia, consideration
should be given to their being prosecuted by governments of countries in which
they hold dual citizenship.[fn]Many Somali elites possess dual
citizenship. For example, 124 of Somalia’s 283 MPs and Senators are from the
diaspora. President Farmajo is a U.S. citizen and previously worked for the New
York State government in Buffalo.
A. Exploitation of IDPs
Most IDPs, both new and older, live in makeshift camps in
major cities and towns. With few if any employment opportunities, they
typically survive on remittances from relatives abroad and international
assistance.[fn]Remittances constitute a crucial lifeline for many
Somalis. The Somali diaspora sends an estimated $1.3 billion back home annually
through remittance companies. “Somalia; Overview”, www.worldbank.org.Hide Footnote In some camps, so-called gatekeepers
masquerading as camp elders manipulate aid deliveries and extort bribes.[fn]Ahmed
Ibrahim, aka Ahmed Vision, a prominent activist and a founder of the Caawi
Walaal relief campaign, recently described the resurgence of “gatekeepers” (a
scourge of the 2011 famine) in IDP settlements, explaining how they take a cut
of the relief items and hire crowds to pose as famine victims. “The threat of
gatekeepers to averting famine from Somalia”, Hiiraan Online, 21 March 2017.Hide Footnote Likewise, many IDPs face abuse at the
hands of government and private actors, who often have links to local
authorities, business people and militias. Beatings and rape are reportedly
common.[fn]See Laetitia Bader, “In Crisis-Stricken Somalia, No Safe
Haven”, Human Rights Watch, 18 April 2017; “Somalia: Forced Evictions of
Displaced People”, Human Rights Watch, 20 April 2015; “When Push Comes to
Shove: Displaced Somalis Under Threat”, Refugees International, 8 November
2013; “Somalia: Protect Displaced People at Risk New Government Should Tackle
Past Injustice, Abuses”, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2013.Hide Footnote Awareness of such dynamics would help aid
agencies mitigate the power that predatory officials and private gatekeepers
exercise over vulnerable communities by investigating allegations of abuse and
orienting assistance directly to individuals and their families, notably via
cash transfers, rather than to communities.
major cities and towns. With few if any employment opportunities, they
typically survive on remittances from relatives abroad and international
assistance.[fn]Remittances constitute a crucial lifeline for many
Somalis. The Somali diaspora sends an estimated $1.3 billion back home annually
through remittance companies. “Somalia; Overview”, www.worldbank.org.Hide Footnote In some camps, so-called gatekeepers
masquerading as camp elders manipulate aid deliveries and extort bribes.[fn]Ahmed
Ibrahim, aka Ahmed Vision, a prominent activist and a founder of the Caawi
Walaal relief campaign, recently described the resurgence of “gatekeepers” (a
scourge of the 2011 famine) in IDP settlements, explaining how they take a cut
of the relief items and hire crowds to pose as famine victims. “The threat of
gatekeepers to averting famine from Somalia”, Hiiraan Online, 21 March 2017.Hide Footnote Likewise, many IDPs face abuse at the
hands of government and private actors, who often have links to local
authorities, business people and militias. Beatings and rape are reportedly
common.[fn]See Laetitia Bader, “In Crisis-Stricken Somalia, No Safe
Haven”, Human Rights Watch, 18 April 2017; “Somalia: Forced Evictions of
Displaced People”, Human Rights Watch, 20 April 2015; “When Push Comes to
Shove: Displaced Somalis Under Threat”, Refugees International, 8 November
2013; “Somalia: Protect Displaced People at Risk New Government Should Tackle
Past Injustice, Abuses”, Human Rights Watch, 26 March 2013.Hide Footnote Awareness of such dynamics would help aid
agencies mitigate the power that predatory officials and private gatekeepers
exercise over vulnerable communities by investigating allegations of abuse and
orienting assistance directly to individuals and their families, notably via
cash transfers, rather than to communities.
B. Violence against Women
Somalia ranks as one of the most inhospitable country for
women,[fn]See “The world’s most dangerous countries for women”,
TrustLaw – Thomson Reuters Foundation, 15 June 2011.Hide Footnote
a situation compounded by hunger, conflict and mass displacement. In the
wake of the drought, and while precise data is lacking, reports suggest rape
and other forms of sexual violence are widespread.[fn]“In
Crisis-Stricken Somalia, No Safe Haven”, op. cit.; “Somalia”, 2016 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
3 March 2017, www.state.gov; “Somalia”,
Amnesty International, Annual Report 2016/2017, 22 February 2017.Hide Footnote Girls and women in displacement camps and
those who have fled hunger-stricken villages on foot in remote areas are
particularly at risk. As a result, the government has deployed additional
police and special gender protection personnel to the camps. But more is
needed. In particular, parliament ought to pass more stringent laws
criminalising rape and ending the traditional practice (derived from xeer
customs) of settling rape cases though clan negotiations that typically entail
providing compensation to the victim, often in the form of a marriage offer.
women,[fn]See “The world’s most dangerous countries for women”,
TrustLaw – Thomson Reuters Foundation, 15 June 2011.Hide Footnote
a situation compounded by hunger, conflict and mass displacement. In the
wake of the drought, and while precise data is lacking, reports suggest rape
and other forms of sexual violence are widespread.[fn]“In
Crisis-Stricken Somalia, No Safe Haven”, op. cit.; “Somalia”, 2016 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
3 March 2017, www.state.gov; “Somalia”,
Amnesty International, Annual Report 2016/2017, 22 February 2017.Hide Footnote Girls and women in displacement camps and
those who have fled hunger-stricken villages on foot in remote areas are
particularly at risk. As a result, the government has deployed additional
police and special gender protection personnel to the camps. But more is
needed. In particular, parliament ought to pass more stringent laws
criminalising rape and ending the traditional practice (derived from xeer
customs) of settling rape cases though clan negotiations that typically entail
providing compensation to the victim, often in the form of a marriage offer.
This is symptomatic of a far wider problem. While the
short-term focus ought to be on measures aimed at curbing sexual violence in
IDP camps and amending rape laws, any sustainable answer will require Somalia
Federal Government efforts to promote and institutionalise greater protection
for women. Newly elected legislators – of 283, 63 are women – have an historic
opportunity to seek change in this area.[fn]“Somalia: Transforming
Hope into Stability”, Crisis Group Commentary, 30 April 2017.
short-term focus ought to be on measures aimed at curbing sexual violence in
IDP camps and amending rape laws, any sustainable answer will require Somalia
Federal Government efforts to promote and institutionalise greater protection
for women. Newly elected legislators – of 283, 63 are women – have an historic
opportunity to seek change in this area.[fn]“Somalia: Transforming
Hope into Stability”, Crisis Group Commentary, 30 April 2017.
A. International Response
Donors and humanitarian agencies, including the UN, were
better prepared and quicker to respond to warnings of impending famine in early
2017. Since January, the UN estimates that the Somalia humanitarian appeal
received “unprecedented levels of funding”, with close to $600 million raised
in direct donations or pledges.[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
In early March, the UN launched an $825 million appeal.[fn]“Somalia:
Transforming Hope into Stability”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
Although precise figures remain unclear, the overall funding gap has
substantially narrowed in recent weeks, thanks notably to significant pledges
from the UK, Japan and Germany.[fn]On 13 March, the UK announced it
would fund a £16 million (nearly $20 million) program to help avert famine.
This is part of a wider UKAid drought intervention for Somalia totalling £110
million ($136 million). On 14 March, Japan announced an Emergency Grant Aid of
$26 million for relief efforts in the Middle East and Africa through six
international organisations and agencies including the World Food Programme. Of
this package, $8.5 million has been allocated to Somalia. “UK Government
allocates £16 million to critical drought response in Somalia”, Relief Web, 13
April 2017. “Emergency Grant Aid in response to famine disaster in the Middle
East and Africa regions”, Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Nairobi, 14 March
2017.Hide Footnote Turkey and UAE likewise
significantly upped their aid operations, typically conducted outside the UN
aid system. The #TurkishAirlinesHelpSomalia and #LoveArmyforSomalia
social media campaigns garnered the support of many international celebrities,
helped draw attention to the food crisis and raised more than $1 million.
Turkish Airlines eventually fulfilled its promise and delivered 60 tons of
humanitarian aid to Mogadishu.[fn]“Turkish Airlines deliver 60 tons
of food aid to drought-stricken Somalia”, Anadolu Agency, 5 April 2017.Hide Footnote More recently, a campaign by the Emirates
Red Crescent Society reportedly raised $45 million for drought relief.[fn]“Awqaf
donates Dh1m to Somalia aid campaign”, The Nation (UAE), 16 April 2017.Hide Footnote Altogether a massive emergency relief
operation is underway bringing together many foreign and local NGOs.[fn]“Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”,
better prepared and quicker to respond to warnings of impending famine in early
2017. Since January, the UN estimates that the Somalia humanitarian appeal
received “unprecedented levels of funding”, with close to $600 million raised
in direct donations or pledges.[fn]“Somalia Drought Response:
Situational Report No.5”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
In early March, the UN launched an $825 million appeal.[fn]“Somalia:
Transforming Hope into Stability”, op. cit.Hide Footnote
Although precise figures remain unclear, the overall funding gap has
substantially narrowed in recent weeks, thanks notably to significant pledges
from the UK, Japan and Germany.[fn]On 13 March, the UK announced it
would fund a £16 million (nearly $20 million) program to help avert famine.
This is part of a wider UKAid drought intervention for Somalia totalling £110
million ($136 million). On 14 March, Japan announced an Emergency Grant Aid of
$26 million for relief efforts in the Middle East and Africa through six
international organisations and agencies including the World Food Programme. Of
this package, $8.5 million has been allocated to Somalia. “UK Government
allocates £16 million to critical drought response in Somalia”, Relief Web, 13
April 2017. “Emergency Grant Aid in response to famine disaster in the Middle
East and Africa regions”, Press Release, Embassy of Japan, Nairobi, 14 March
2017.Hide Footnote Turkey and UAE likewise
significantly upped their aid operations, typically conducted outside the UN
aid system. The #TurkishAirlinesHelpSomalia and #LoveArmyforSomalia
social media campaigns garnered the support of many international celebrities,
helped draw attention to the food crisis and raised more than $1 million.
Turkish Airlines eventually fulfilled its promise and delivered 60 tons of
humanitarian aid to Mogadishu.[fn]“Turkish Airlines deliver 60 tons
of food aid to drought-stricken Somalia”, Anadolu Agency, 5 April 2017.Hide Footnote More recently, a campaign by the Emirates
Red Crescent Society reportedly raised $45 million for drought relief.[fn]“Awqaf
donates Dh1m to Somalia aid campaign”, The Nation (UAE), 16 April 2017.Hide Footnote Altogether a massive emergency relief
operation is underway bringing together many foreign and local NGOs.[fn]“Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”,
Improvements in coordination and management of
humanitarian operations partly reflect lessons learned from the 2011 famine.
The “Access Taskforce”, set up in 2015 by aid agencies operating in Somalia to
negotiate better access with the patchwork of different authorities and
minimise official red tape, helped create far more favourable aid delivery
conditions.[fn]The Access Taskforce is a forum to enable better
coordination of humanitarian action. “Somalia: Humanitarian Strategy,
2016-2018”, UNOCHA, 30 May 2016.Hide Footnote That
said, coverage varies regionally, with better results in most of the north east
and north west, and more limited ones in the south-central region.[fn]“Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”, op. cit.
humanitarian operations partly reflect lessons learned from the 2011 famine.
The “Access Taskforce”, set up in 2015 by aid agencies operating in Somalia to
negotiate better access with the patchwork of different authorities and
minimise official red tape, helped create far more favourable aid delivery
conditions.[fn]The Access Taskforce is a forum to enable better
coordination of humanitarian action. “Somalia: Humanitarian Strategy,
2016-2018”, UNOCHA, 30 May 2016.Hide Footnote That
said, coverage varies regionally, with better results in most of the north east
and north west, and more limited ones in the south-central region.[fn]“Humanitarian
Bulletin, April 2017”, op. cit.
B. Domestic Response
So far, President Mohammed Abdullahi “Farmajo” and his
government have demonstrated strong leadership in addressing the drought
emergency. The president convened a major meeting of all stakeholders in
Mogadishu just days after his late February election; he put Prime Minister
Hassan Kheyre in charge of government efforts; and the government set up a
humanitarian affairs ministry and National Drought Committee to coordinate all
relief efforts in Mogadishu and in the federal member states – developments
welcomed by donors and relief agencies, even though they recognise that the
government currently lacks both capacity and revenue to do much more than
coordinate.[fn]“Somalia: Operational plan for famine prevention
(Jan-Jun 2017)”, UNOCHA, 17 February 2017.
government have demonstrated strong leadership in addressing the drought
emergency. The president convened a major meeting of all stakeholders in
Mogadishu just days after his late February election; he put Prime Minister
Hassan Kheyre in charge of government efforts; and the government set up a
humanitarian affairs ministry and National Drought Committee to coordinate all
relief efforts in Mogadishu and in the federal member states – developments
welcomed by donors and relief agencies, even though they recognise that the
government currently lacks both capacity and revenue to do much more than
coordinate.[fn]“Somalia: Operational plan for famine prevention
(Jan-Jun 2017)”, UNOCHA, 17 February 2017.
Other actors have lent a hand. In a symbolic gesture, the
Somali Federal Parliament donated 50 per cent of presidential candidate
registration fees totalling $360,000 to the drought committee. Students have
also been encouraged to donate a minimum of $10 each. Private Somali citizens
are pitching in. Companies and businesspeople likewise have contributed
significantly to the relief campaign. The most significant local endeavour has
been the Caawi Walaal campaign initiated by local and diaspora Somali
activists; it has raised thousands of dollars and its volunteers provide water
and food to some of the country’s remotest parts which are inaccessible to
traditional relief agencies.
Somali Federal Parliament donated 50 per cent of presidential candidate
registration fees totalling $360,000 to the drought committee. Students have
also been encouraged to donate a minimum of $10 each. Private Somali citizens
are pitching in. Companies and businesspeople likewise have contributed
significantly to the relief campaign. The most significant local endeavour has
been the Caawi Walaal campaign initiated by local and diaspora Somali
activists; it has raised thousands of dollars and its volunteers provide water
and food to some of the country’s remotest parts which are inaccessible to
traditional relief agencies.
