Arms Control & Disarmament: A Failed Marriage
by Richard Falk, 25 May 2020. The ongoing pandemic
makes us obsessively aware of the precariousness of life, and if from the U.S.,
the mendacious incompetence of our political leadership. Yet, it also makes
most of us as obsessively complacent when the threats seem remote and abstract.
This complacency with respect to contagious disease greatly worsened the level
of fatalities, as well as the profound social and economic dislocations
associated with the still unfolding COVID-19 experience. Such a pandemic was
unimaginable until it became too real and omnipresent to be imagined, but only
experienced at various degrees of separation. Being obsessed, fearful, and
resentful is not the same as being imagined.
makes us obsessively aware of the precariousness of life, and if from the U.S.,
the mendacious incompetence of our political leadership. Yet, it also makes
most of us as obsessively complacent when the threats seem remote and abstract.
This complacency with respect to contagious disease greatly worsened the level
of fatalities, as well as the profound social and economic dislocations
associated with the still unfolding COVID-19 experience. Such a pandemic was
unimaginable until it became too real and omnipresent to be imagined, but only
experienced at various degrees of separation. Being obsessed, fearful, and
resentful is not the same as being imagined.
The linkages between contagious disease and climate change is too evident to
ignore altogether: The falling price of oil, the declining carbon emissions,
the global imperative of cooperation, uneven vulnerabilities, and the relevance
of justice and empathy.
ignore altogether: The falling price of oil, the declining carbon emissions,
the global imperative of cooperation, uneven vulnerabilities, and the relevance
of justice and empathy.
With respect to nuclear hazards, especially from the weaponry and their
possible use, there is a growing disconnect between risk and behavior, a combination
of nuclearism prevailing among the political elites of the nuclear weapons
states and public disregard. There is a greater appreciation of the dangers
associated with nuclear energy. The disaster at Fukushima, and longer ago at
Chernobyl, are grim reminders of risks and potential catastrophe.
possible use, there is a growing disconnect between risk and behavior, a combination
of nuclearism prevailing among the political elites of the nuclear weapons
states and public disregard. There is a greater appreciation of the dangers
associated with nuclear energy. The disaster at Fukushima, and longer ago at
Chernobyl, are grim reminders of risks and potential catastrophe.
Yet surrounding nuclear weaponry there is an aura of complacency reinforced
by a false sense of self-interest. The complacency arises from the startling
fact that no nuclear weapon has been exploded during a combat situation in the
75 years since the horrifying attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Complacency
also feeds off the suppressed realization that governments base their ultimate
security on threats to annihilate tens of millions of innocent persons and
subject our natural habitats to extreme disaster. With regard to nuclear
dangers assuming the dreaded will never happen could turn out to be the
greatest bio-ethical folly in the entire history of the human species. We
forget folk wisdom at our peril: ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.’ Governments need to invest their energies and resources in anticipatory approaches
to impending disasters and not entrust the collective fate of humanity to reactive responses
when various dark unimaginables happen as they certainly will.
by a false sense of self-interest. The complacency arises from the startling
fact that no nuclear weapon has been exploded during a combat situation in the
75 years since the horrifying attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Complacency
also feeds off the suppressed realization that governments base their ultimate
security on threats to annihilate tens of millions of innocent persons and
subject our natural habitats to extreme disaster. With regard to nuclear
dangers assuming the dreaded will never happen could turn out to be the
greatest bio-ethical folly in the entire history of the human species. We
forget folk wisdom at our peril: ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of
cure.’ Governments need to invest their energies and resources in anticipatory approaches
to impending disasters and not entrust the collective fate of humanity to reactive responses
when various dark unimaginables happen as they certainly will.
In this spirit, I argue for a better understanding the distinction between
arms control and disarmament approaches to nuclearism, which helps explain why
choosing the disarmament path is vital for the human future. Despite this
contention, nuclear disarmament is currently so low on the policy agenda of the
nuclear weapons states as to be dismissed as either superfluous or utopian.
arms control and disarmament approaches to nuclearism, which helps explain why
choosing the disarmament path is vital for the human future. Despite this
contention, nuclear disarmament is currently so low on the policy agenda of the
nuclear weapons states as to be dismissed as either superfluous or utopian.
The Distinction
It is often argued that arms control is a realistic
approach to national security in the nuclear age that can be thought of as
satisfying preconditions for negotiating a verified nuclear disarmament
agreement when international conditions are right. Arms control measures have
the added benefit of reducing risks of an accidental or mistaken use of nuclear
weapons and of avoiding wasteful costs associated with arms competition
designed to maintain security in relation to adversaries. There are good faith
beliefs present in this support for arms control, but this advocacy hides,
often unconsciously, an important quite different more complex and confusing
parts of a broader story. In addition to reducing risks and miscalculations of
intended nuclear war or expensive and dangerous extensions of competition in
nuclear armaments, arms control seems to have as its primary goal bringing as
much stability as possible to a structure of world order that is presumed to be
nuclear armed. It also has a secondary seldom avowed goal of providing an
instrument useful in the conduct of foreign policy. It allows some nuclear
weapons states to take tactical advantage of their posture of nuclear
superiority when confronting one another or of positing nuclear threats,
especially against non-nuclear hostile countries in confrontational situations.
approach to national security in the nuclear age that can be thought of as
satisfying preconditions for negotiating a verified nuclear disarmament
agreement when international conditions are right. Arms control measures have
the added benefit of reducing risks of an accidental or mistaken use of nuclear
weapons and of avoiding wasteful costs associated with arms competition
designed to maintain security in relation to adversaries. There are good faith
beliefs present in this support for arms control, but this advocacy hides,
often unconsciously, an important quite different more complex and confusing
parts of a broader story. In addition to reducing risks and miscalculations of
intended nuclear war or expensive and dangerous extensions of competition in
nuclear armaments, arms control seems to have as its primary goal bringing as
much stability as possible to a structure of world order that is presumed to be
nuclear armed. It also has a secondary seldom avowed goal of providing an
instrument useful in the conduct of foreign policy. It allows some nuclear
weapons states to take tactical advantage of their posture of nuclear
superiority when confronting one another or of positing nuclear threats,
especially against non-nuclear hostile countries in confrontational situations.
In contrast, the advocacy of nuclear disarmament believes unconditionally
that the only safe and decent course of action is to do everything possible to
get safely rid of nuclear weaponry as soon as possible. Nuclear weapons pose
threats to human wellbeing and ecological stability in the form of catastrophe
and even extinction. Disarmament goals are as a practical matter at odds with
the arms control approach for at least three major reasons. First of all, a
disarmament process threatens widely accepted ideas about nuclear stability.
Instead, it generates uncertainty, especially if not coupled in its latter
stages with a global demilitarization. process. The arms control view is that
the more stable the overall political environment with respect to the weaponry
the safer and more secure the world. The attainment of such stability carries
with it a lessened incentive for political leaders to embark upon a
denuclearizing disarmament alternative. This reluctance is not primarily, as
often alleged, because of destabilizing risks of cheating and fears that any
renewal of nuclear arms competition would be more dangerous than is a world
order in which the nuclear weapons states exercise prudence and prevent further
proliferation of the weaponry, but reflects militarist habits and geopolitical
calculations.
that the only safe and decent course of action is to do everything possible to
get safely rid of nuclear weaponry as soon as possible. Nuclear weapons pose
threats to human wellbeing and ecological stability in the form of catastrophe
and even extinction. Disarmament goals are as a practical matter at odds with
the arms control approach for at least three major reasons. First of all, a
disarmament process threatens widely accepted ideas about nuclear stability.
Instead, it generates uncertainty, especially if not coupled in its latter
stages with a global demilitarization. process. The arms control view is that
the more stable the overall political environment with respect to the weaponry
the safer and more secure the world. The attainment of such stability carries
with it a lessened incentive for political leaders to embark upon a
denuclearizing disarmament alternative. This reluctance is not primarily, as
often alleged, because of destabilizing risks of cheating and fears that any
renewal of nuclear arms competition would be more dangerous than is a world
order in which the nuclear weapons states exercise prudence and prevent further
proliferation of the weaponry, but reflects militarist habits and geopolitical
calculations.
Secondly, there exists a powerful nuclear establishment joining parts of
the governmental bureaucracy with weapons labs and war industry private sector
interests. Thirdly, and least acknowledged, is the degree to which foreign
policy planners in several nuclear weapons states find and propose roles for
these weapons to deter provocations, to solidify alliances, exert geopolitical
and tactical leverage, and provide a hedge against future uncertainties.
the governmental bureaucracy with weapons labs and war industry private sector
interests. Thirdly, and least acknowledged, is the degree to which foreign
policy planners in several nuclear weapons states find and propose roles for
these weapons to deter provocations, to solidify alliances, exert geopolitical
and tactical leverage, and provide a hedge against future uncertainties.
Although such considerations are not unfamiliar in the
strategic literature, the link to arms control rarely is explicitly made, or if
made, is done so in a rather misleading and superficial manner that presupposes
its compatibility with disarmament advocacy. Sometimes, the argument is made
that arms control is a confidence-building step toward disarmament or that
nuclear disarmament, although not presently attainable, remains the ultimate goal,
but the time must be right. The lesson drawn is that in the meantime given
existing world conditions, arms control is the most and best that can be hoped
for, while nuclear disarmament remains the shared hope of humanity if
conditions ever become suitable to move seriously toward the elimination of the
weaponry. Underlying these justifications for relegating the prospects of
getting rid of nuclear weaponry to forever horizons—by proclaiming disarmament
as the ‘ultimate’ goal—is to signal that it is not really a goal at all except
as a way of keeping genuine disarmament advocates appeased and confused.
strategic literature, the link to arms control rarely is explicitly made, or if
made, is done so in a rather misleading and superficial manner that presupposes
its compatibility with disarmament advocacy. Sometimes, the argument is made
that arms control is a confidence-building step toward disarmament or that
nuclear disarmament, although not presently attainable, remains the ultimate goal,
but the time must be right. The lesson drawn is that in the meantime given
existing world conditions, arms control is the most and best that can be hoped
for, while nuclear disarmament remains the shared hope of humanity if
conditions ever become suitable to move seriously toward the elimination of the
weaponry. Underlying these justifications for relegating the prospects of
getting rid of nuclear weaponry to forever horizons—by proclaiming disarmament
as the ‘ultimate’ goal—is to signal that it is not really a goal at all except
as a way of keeping genuine disarmament advocates appeased and confused.
The true story is that the national security
establishment, at least in the U.S., and undoubtedly elsewhere, is opposed
to nuclear disarmament as a policy option, for two interrelated
reasons. First, possession of nuclear weapons gives states international
prestige and leverage even if never actively relied upon. Secondly, avoiding
disarmament keeps in being a regime of ‘nuclear apartheid’ enabling nuclear
weapons states to pose unspeakable threats in crisis situations that are likely
quite effective, given the extreme vulnerability of non-nuclear states. Merely
having a nuclear weapons arsenal sends an intimidating message to potential
adversaries, especially if nuclear weapons are being designed and developed
with future combat missions in mind.
establishment, at least in the U.S., and undoubtedly elsewhere, is opposed
to nuclear disarmament as a policy option, for two interrelated
reasons. First, possession of nuclear weapons gives states international
prestige and leverage even if never actively relied upon. Secondly, avoiding
disarmament keeps in being a regime of ‘nuclear apartheid’ enabling nuclear
weapons states to pose unspeakable threats in crisis situations that are likely
quite effective, given the extreme vulnerability of non-nuclear states. Merely
having a nuclear weapons arsenal sends an intimidating message to potential
adversaries, especially if nuclear weapons are being designed and developed
with future combat missions in mind.
The ambiguities of arms control are most vividly exposed with respect to
the establishment and maintenance of the anti-proliferation regime. The United
States claims that it is carrying out a positive world order role by taking
responsibility for ‘enforcing’ the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This form of
geopolitical enforcement, that is, without UN authorization or legal
prerogative, is directed against certain outlier countries (e.g. Iran, North
Korea) that are accused of seeking such weaponry. It is questionable whether
such behavior should be treated as arms control. It seems more appropriately
viewed as an integral nuclear component of global hegemony.
the establishment and maintenance of the anti-proliferation regime. The United
States claims that it is carrying out a positive world order role by taking
responsibility for ‘enforcing’ the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This form of
geopolitical enforcement, that is, without UN authorization or legal
prerogative, is directed against certain outlier countries (e.g. Iran, North
Korea) that are accused of seeking such weaponry. It is questionable whether
such behavior should be treated as arms control. It seems more appropriately
viewed as an integral nuclear component of global hegemony.
The Anti-Proliferation Regime
There are other features of the anti-Proliferation
regime that occasion suspicion.
regime that occasion suspicion.
Double standards pervade the implementation of the NPT. The standards of
nonproliferation found in this widely ratified treaty are not applied
consistently. If the government evading proliferation controls is a strategic
ally (Israel) or if the country crossing the nuclear threshold is too large to
challenge (India, Pakistan), the enlargement of the nuclear club will be
tolerated, or even encouraged. Yet if a hostile country seeks the weapons for
credible deterrence reasons, then it will experience various forms of pressure,
and even become subject to sanctions and threats of attack.
nonproliferation found in this widely ratified treaty are not applied
consistently. If the government evading proliferation controls is a strategic
ally (Israel) or if the country crossing the nuclear threshold is too large to
challenge (India, Pakistan), the enlargement of the nuclear club will be
tolerated, or even encouraged. Yet if a hostile country seeks the weapons for
credible deterrence reasons, then it will experience various forms of pressure,
and even become subject to sanctions and threats of attack.
Nuclear deployments and threats to use nuclear weapons confer geopolitical
advantages and options on the nuclear weapons states, besides giving some
security about the threats of being attacked. Qaddafi was undoubtedly correct
when he said that Libya would not have been attacked in 2011`had it possessed
nuclear weapons, and Iraq in 2003 was likely attacked because it didn’t have a
nuclear deterrent. It is instructive that North Korea was not attacked once it
crossed the nuclear threshold even in a small, largely symbolic, manner.
advantages and options on the nuclear weapons states, besides giving some
security about the threats of being attacked. Qaddafi was undoubtedly correct
when he said that Libya would not have been attacked in 2011`had it possessed
nuclear weapons, and Iraq in 2003 was likely attacked because it didn’t have a
nuclear deterrent. It is instructive that North Korea was not attacked once it
crossed the nuclear threshold even in a small, largely symbolic, manner.
This rationale for retaining nuclearism was starkly confirmed by the formal
statement issued by the U.S., France, and the UK on July 13, 2017 as to why they
totally rejected any connection with the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, emphasizing the positive role of nuclear weaponry in keeping
the peace. In view of these considerations, why do NGOs in civil society
continue to act as if they are working for nuclear disarmament when they do not
reject the essential elements of an arms control approach?
statement issued by the U.S., France, and the UK on July 13, 2017 as to why they
totally rejected any connection with the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, emphasizing the positive role of nuclear weaponry in keeping
the peace. In view of these considerations, why do NGOs in civil society
continue to act as if they are working for nuclear disarmament when they do not
reject the essential elements of an arms control approach?
Above all, despite experience and evidence, ‘the arms control first’
community believes that reducing the size of the arsenal and agreeing not to
develop some weapons systems are helpful measures on their own as well lending
themselves to being promoted as stepping stones to disarmament negotiations.
Additionally, there is the belief that the retention of nuclear weapons is so
entrenched that only arms control agreements are feasible, and disarmament a
diversionary pipe dream. From this perspective, arms control arrangements are
better than nothing even if completely unrelated to achieving nuclear
disarmament. Finally, as arms control activism is concentrated in Washington,
the only way for political moderates in civil society to get a seat at the
table set by government is to shed the utopian image of disarmament advocacy
and settle for what is feasible although it means dancing with the devil.
community believes that reducing the size of the arsenal and agreeing not to
develop some weapons systems are helpful measures on their own as well lending
themselves to being promoted as stepping stones to disarmament negotiations.
Additionally, there is the belief that the retention of nuclear weapons is so
entrenched that only arms control agreements are feasible, and disarmament a
diversionary pipe dream. From this perspective, arms control arrangements are
better than nothing even if completely unrelated to achieving nuclear
disarmament. Finally, as arms control activism is concentrated in Washington,
the only way for political moderates in civil society to get a seat at the
table set by government is to shed the utopian image of disarmament advocacy
and settle for what is feasible although it means dancing with the devil.
We can ask, then, where does this leave those
dedicated to peace, and especially to avoiding any threat or use of a nuclear
weapon in the course of a war? In my view, it is not appropriate to adopt
an either/or position of saying no disarmament because unattainable or never
arms control because it legitimates nuclear apartheid, and closes its eyes to
geopolitical reliance on the leverage gained by wielding the weaponry. It is
currently important to challenge public complacency about nuclear weaponry because
these weapons have not been used since 1945, and to become attentive to the
warnings of impending danger signaled by moving the highly credible,
risk-assessing Doomsday Clock of The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists to within 100 seconds to midnight, or closer to doomsday
than it has ever been since established in 1947. In effect, it is delusional to
suppose that we can indefinitely co-exist with this infernal weaponry,
especially given the lethal blend of demagogues and nationalist passions that
dominate the governance structures of the world.
dedicated to peace, and especially to avoiding any threat or use of a nuclear
weapon in the course of a war? In my view, it is not appropriate to adopt
an either/or position of saying no disarmament because unattainable or never
arms control because it legitimates nuclear apartheid, and closes its eyes to
geopolitical reliance on the leverage gained by wielding the weaponry. It is
currently important to challenge public complacency about nuclear weaponry because
these weapons have not been used since 1945, and to become attentive to the
warnings of impending danger signaled by moving the highly credible,
risk-assessing Doomsday Clock of The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists to within 100 seconds to midnight, or closer to doomsday
than it has ever been since established in 1947. In effect, it is delusional to
suppose that we can indefinitely co-exist with this infernal weaponry,
especially given the lethal blend of demagogues and nationalist passions that
dominate the governance structures of the world.
It would also be helpful to call attention to the fact that the NPT in
Article VI imposes an unconditional obligation of nuclear weapons states to
engage in good faith nuclear disarmament negotiations as part of the agreement
reached with other states to forego the nuclear weapons option. The obligatory
character of this legal commitment was unanimously affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion delivered in 1996, and
yet by continuing to invest heavily in the continuous modernization of the
nuclear weapons arsenal, including the development of new nuclear weapons
designed for possible combat use means that this central legal obligation of
the NPT regime is being defiantly ignored. There is no disposition on the part
of any state to call for the geopolitical enforcement of Article VI, and until
this happens the treaty is mainly functions as a disguise for nuclearism and
nuclear apartheid.
Article VI imposes an unconditional obligation of nuclear weapons states to
engage in good faith nuclear disarmament negotiations as part of the agreement
reached with other states to forego the nuclear weapons option. The obligatory
character of this legal commitment was unanimously affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion delivered in 1996, and
yet by continuing to invest heavily in the continuous modernization of the
nuclear weapons arsenal, including the development of new nuclear weapons
designed for possible combat use means that this central legal obligation of
the NPT regime is being defiantly ignored. There is no disposition on the part
of any state to call for the geopolitical enforcement of Article VI, and until
this happens the treaty is mainly functions as a disguise for nuclearism and
nuclear apartheid.
Even if this Article VI legal commitment did not exist, the idea of resting
security on discretionary threats to retaliate by destroying tens of millions
of innocent civilians and contaminating the atmosphere of the entire planet
quite possibly causing what experts call ‘a nuclear famine’ and widespread disease.
Such omnicidal courses of action underline the immorality of resting security
on such massive indiscriminate nuclear strikes that would fill the air with
contaminating radioactivity. The UN ICAN Treaty, now formally ratified by 37 of
the 50 States needed to bring the agreement into force is an important move in
the right direction, and far more a helpful signpost than is an uncritical
endorsement of this or that arms control proposal. Yet unless the ICAN Treaty
is extended in its coverage to the nuclear weapons states it remains in the
realm of rhetorical moralism lacking behavioral consequences.
security on discretionary threats to retaliate by destroying tens of millions
of innocent civilians and contaminating the atmosphere of the entire planet
quite possibly causing what experts call ‘a nuclear famine’ and widespread disease.
Such omnicidal courses of action underline the immorality of resting security
on such massive indiscriminate nuclear strikes that would fill the air with
contaminating radioactivity. The UN ICAN Treaty, now formally ratified by 37 of
the 50 States needed to bring the agreement into force is an important move in
the right direction, and far more a helpful signpost than is an uncritical
endorsement of this or that arms control proposal. Yet unless the ICAN Treaty
is extended in its coverage to the nuclear weapons states it remains in the
realm of rhetorical moralism lacking behavioral consequences.
There are arms control measures that can be supported in good conscience,
including No First Use Declarations removing ambiguity from threats to use the
weapons, and de-alerting measures that gives leaders more time to avoid
accidental or unintended uses. Such measures rarely motivate champions of arms
control because their advocacy hampers cooperation with geopolitical
pragmatists who are running the world. The refusal to embrace No First Use
thinking in doctrine and practice is revealing: it suggests that the real
interface of compatibility is between arms control and geopolitics rather than
as proclaimed, as between arms control and disarmament.
including No First Use Declarations removing ambiguity from threats to use the
weapons, and de-alerting measures that gives leaders more time to avoid
accidental or unintended uses. Such measures rarely motivate champions of arms
control because their advocacy hampers cooperation with geopolitical
pragmatists who are running the world. The refusal to embrace No First Use
thinking in doctrine and practice is revealing: it suggests that the real
interface of compatibility is between arms control and geopolitics rather than
as proclaimed, as between arms control and disarmament.
In the end, anyone genuinely devoted to world peace needs to recognize the
urgency of taking an unconditional stand against retaining nuclear weapons as
an indispensable step toward achieving peace for all peoples on earth and part
of the challenge of being ecologically responsible guardians of planetary
viability.
urgency of taking an unconditional stand against retaining nuclear weapons as
an indispensable step toward achieving peace for all peoples on earth and part
of the challenge of being ecologically responsible guardians of planetary
viability.
