General

Why is Israel propping up Hamas in Gaza?

Ben
Caspit, Al Monitor, June 27, 2018

Israel is
implementing a concerted policy of keeping Hamas in power on its southern
border so it can focus its energies on threats from the north, especially the
Iranian presence in Syria. 
REUTERS/Ronen
Zvulun. Israeli soldiers stand behind signs indicating distances to different
cities on Mount Bental, an observation post in the Israeli-occupied Golan
Heights overlooking the Quneitra crossing, May 10, 2018.

Over the
last two years, Israel has employed two different and even
contradictory military strategies: one on its northern front against
Syria, Hezbollah and Iran, and the other on its southern front against
Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other “recalcitrant” organizations in Gaza.

In the
north, Israel is constantly on the offensive and — according to foreign
reports — quick to threaten, initiate and exact a price from the
enemy. In the south, however, Israel has adopted a cautious tone of
containment and is on guard to avoid being dragged into a military
confrontation. In short, Israel shows a lot less initiative in the south and
takes Hamas’ needs into account. In the north, however, Israel uses all
its strength to fan the flames of domestic Iranian conflicts and try
to undermine the
ayatollah-led regime
. In the south, Israel uses all its strength to
maintain and protect Hamas’ rule.
Another
mysterious aerial
assault in Syria
was reported on June 25, this time close
to the Damascus airport. Several missiles, evidently launched from a fighter
jet, struck trucks containing a shipment of weapons and ammunition that a
little earlier had been unloaded from a transport plane that had
arrived from Tehran. The attack is attributed to Israel, which is keeping quiet
on the matter. It is the second attack in a week attributed to the Israeli air
force on Syrian soil. No one has even tried to keep count of the strikes
allegedly conducted by Israel since the beginning of the year.
The
attacks are, ostensibly, a direct, determined continuation of
Israel’s policy of enforcing its redlines on the transfer of weapons
and arms from Iran to the Syrian front and of anything that falls under
the category of “Iranian consolidation in Syria.” The policy is based on
strategy
presented by Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot to the Israeli Cabinet last
May: frequent and ongoing use of force, real-time thwarting of all Iranian
efforts to base itself in Syria and exacting an immediate price from
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime if and when the Iranians or Hezbollah
retaliate against Israel from Syrian territory.
Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been uncharacteristically implementing
the strategy with all his might and without blinking. Thus far, he hasn’t
had to pay much of a price. When elements affiliated with Shiite militias in
Syria tried to launch rockets at the Israeli-held Golan, Israel’s air force
immediately responded by destroying a significant percentage of Iranian
infrastructure in Syria
and eliminating about half of Syria’s
anti-aircraft deployment on May 10. Netanyahu, who has always distanced
himself from military conflicts, “adventures” and provocations, has
changed his tune and is now going all the way on the northern front.
On June
26, Netanyahu uploaded a video to YouTube in which he speaks to the
Iranian people
in English to praise Iran’s national soccer team for
its performance in the FIFA World Cup competition against Portugal and its star
player, Ronaldo. Netanyahu then says, “Can you imagine what your money could do
if it was not spent promoting terrorism, in Syria and in Yemen?” Defense
Minister Avigdor Liberman was even blunter when he posted a message
on social media in Persian, blaming the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and Gen. Qasem Soleimani for squandering
Iran’s resources
on terror activities. Liberman also praised the
relatively successful Iranian performance in the World Cup.
According
to a senior Israeli Cabinet member who spoke to Al-Monitor on the condition of
anonymity, “The prime minister and defense minister are implementing a specific
policy, the main foundation of which is to enforce Israel’s
redlines in Syria
.”
“These
redlines are backed up by direct, spoken messages aimed at the Iranian people
with the goal of speeding up the fall of the Tehran regime,” the source added.
The policy is also based on intelligence reporting that new sanctions imposed
by the United States on Iran are having a dramatically negative
impact on the Iranian economy. This, in turn, is causing internal Iranian
agitation.
What
about Israel’s south? It is exactly the opposite. Despite Hamas being
viewed as the long arm of the Iranian Revolution, Israel is extremely careful
not to rock the Gaza boat too much or do anything that might, including
accidentally, cause Hamas to fall.
“Netanyahu
and Liberman are going to great pains to protect Hamas,” a former highly placed
security source told Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity. “They do not
want to overthrow the Hamas regime, and they block the return of the
Palestinian Authority to the Strip because the present situation is convenient
for them. So long as Hamas rules Gaza, the Palestinian people are fragmented,
and Israel has no real partner for any kind of negotiations. In addition, Israel
is doing everything possible to avert another
round of violence
between itself and Gaza during the summer. There
are two reasons for this: The first is because Israel’s efforts are
concentrated on the northern front, and Liberman-Netanyahu do not have the
energy to invest in Gaza now. Second, because the two realize that another
round of fighting in Gaza has no purpose and would only cause more damage. Both
sides would return to the starting point without achieving anything.”
A
former senior military source told Al-Monitor on the condition of
anonymity, “It is better to wait another year or year and a half before marching
into Gaza when the underground obstacles [constructed by Israel] will be
in place and the tunnel threat will be totally neutralized.”
Given the
current situation, the Cabinet agreed to the Israel Defense Forces policy of
not directly thwarting the cells of Gaza residents releasing burning kites and
helium balloons containing flammable substances or explosives. The air force
finds itself firing “near the launcher cells” and not directly at them and hindering the
cars and other vehicles
of the launchers but not the launchers
themselves, as happened June 26. This was also the reason that Liberman
offered an upgraded deal to Hamas earlier this week: construction
of a special platform
 at a Cypriot port that would
function as a seaport for Gaza. Israel would oversee the merchandise unloaded
there and transferred directly to Gaza by boat. In exchange, Israel is
demanding the return of the bodies of the soldiers Hadar Goldin and
Oron Shaul as well as two Israeli citizens held by Hamas in Gaza. At
this stage, Hamas has declined the offer, which will now serve as the basis for
continued, indirect contacts between the sides.
In any
event, the proposal achieved its purpose. It demonstrates an Israeli
initiative to improve the harsh circumstances in Gaza. Israel is doing all this
in the south to gain time to advance efforts on the major playing field in the
north. Its goals with regard to Iran are to distance it from the
border, prevent Iranian consolidation in Syria and support the
Iranian civil protest movement in Iran. In addition to these goals, Israel
will also have to decide in the next few days what to do about a new offensive
by the Syrian army and its partners in the south. The offensive threatens to
even retake the part of the Golan held by Syrian rebels.
Israeli policies
have turned the Golan into a focus of Israeli interests. Will Israel close its
eyes, clench its teeth and reluctantly accept Assad’s return to Quneitra?
The next few days will provide an answer to this question.