General

South Sudan: Time for humanitarians to get tough

by Simon Little, Irin News, 7 August 2017.

As a humanitarian at what point
does one start to think the unthinkable? To question the impact of the aid
provided, or perhaps even wonder if it’s doing more harm than good? Having
served as an aid worker for over 20 years, deploying to countless emergencies,
I’ve rarely had cause to question the primacy of humanitarian aid.
However, South Sudan turns
logical thinking on its head. It blurs the distinction between right and wrong.
It raises serious questions as to whether some of the $2 billion of
humanitarian assistance delivered over the past 18 months is simply fuelling
the war economy and prolonging the conflict.
Before outlining the challenge of
working in an environment where aid is routinely co-opted or misused, it’s
worth reiterating the appalling dimensions of the crisis in South Sudan.
An increasing number of people
(roughly six million or half the population) are considered acutely food
insecure. Of these, 1.7 million are thought to be on the brink of famine.
One-third of the population has been displaced, either internally or across the
region as refugees and 17,000 cases of cholera have been reported in the worst
and most prolonged outbreak since independence in 2011.
The humanitarian crisis has been
caused and compounded by a vicious conflict in which the protagonists
flagrantly disregard humanitarian law, principles and space. The upshot is a
conflict characterised by industrial levels of killing and the use of rape as a
weapon of war.
The gratuitousness of the
conflict translates into appalling levels of need. In global terms, the $1.6
billion sought through the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan is third only to
Syria and Yemen.
In 2017, more than $850 million
has already been committed by the international community and delivered as
food, medical, nutritional and water and sanitation support.
Without such levels of support
the number of acutely malnourished children, or cases of cholera, may well have
been far higher.
But, conversely, had parties to
the conflict not deliberately interfered with the flow of aid, or targeted
humanitarian workers and assets, the situation may have been significantly
better.
Most dangerous place for aid workers
Here’s the rub. South Sudan is
the most dangerous place in the world to be an aid worker. Fifteen
humanitarians have been killed this year and 84 since the conflict erupted in
2013.
The UN’s emergency aid
coordination body, OCHA, has catalogued 492 “access” related incidents so far
this year. Half of all incidents have been accompanied by violence directed
against either personnel or assets.
June was the most brutal month
yet with threatening letters written to national aid workers, and 24
humanitarian compounds broken into and goods looted.
This disregard for humanitarian
action follows a depressingly familiar pattern which culminated in the criminal
attack by government forces on aid workers sheltering in the Terrain hotel,
Juba during fighting in July 2016.
In this terrible incident female
aid workers were raped, others were mock executed, most were beaten and,
tragically, a South Sudanese journalist working for the Internews agency was
killed. The Terrain incident was the devastating low point in a conflict where
there is little safe ground for humanitarians. 
The targeting of humanitarian
workers and assets is compounded by a raft of ever changing and venal
bureaucratic impediments whose express purpose is to exact tribute from the
very agencies seeking to offer lifesaving assistance.
This is nothing new. The
co-option and misappropriation of aid has a long history in South Sudan with
supplies delivered through Operation Lifeline Sudan routinely diverted and/or
redirected by the then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Aid as a resource
In the years either side of
independence, the aid budget was largely overlooked in favour of more sizeable
oil revenues that offered the means to lubricate and control influential
patronage networks.
Petro-dollars propped up the
state post-independence and afforded it the shard of economic legitimacy. But
the fall in global oil market prices led to the tanking of the South Sudanese
economy.
Attenuating oil revenues prompted
rent-seekers to look elsewhere, and with few areas of the economy open for
exploitation, the aid budget once again became an attractive option.  
As part of this, government and
opposition has sought ingenious ways to raise revenue by taxing humanitarian
partners. A notorious recent example was the proposed introduction of a $10,000
work permit fee per individual aid worker which was only abandoned following
strong diplomatic pressure.
No matter, the government changed
tack and swiftly introduced a sevenfold increase in international NGO
registration fees obliging partners to pay a $3,500 levy to maintain their
lifesaving operations.
Further problems stemmed from the
re-division of the state apparatus in December 2015, which increased the number
of states from 10 to 28. While most commentators agree this was primarily an
attempt to shore up the political centre (and with it patronage networks), it
also provided the framework for poorly funded state administrations to raise
revenue through opportunistic subnational taxation.
This continues with humanitarian
agencies regularly requested to pay taxes on the movement of goods and
personnel. 
Impact on response
The movement and flow of
humanitarian aid continues to be co-opted by parties to the conflict and
appropriated in the interests of military objectives. The government’s National
Security Service has repeatedly blocked the delivery of humanitarian supplies
to Kajo Keji in Central Equatoria state thereby denying potentially lifesaving
assistance to a population that it considers supports the opposition.
Similar examples of aid being
diverted or denied have been recorded in opposition-controlled areas.
The humanitarian situation in
South Sudan is the worst I’ve known in two decades, and unless assistance can
be predictably and safely delivered, the return of famine cannot be discounted.
However, the insecurity of the
operating environment, coupled with the direct targeting of humanitarian
action, and predatory bureaucratic processes, compromises the pace, scale and effectiveness
of the overall response.
This is of course entirely
unacceptable. Humanitarian partners deserve the protection and support of those
they are seeking to assist, and government and opposition forces have
responsibilities under International Humanitarian Law to both protect
civilians, and facilitate the delivery of lifesaving assistance.
We need to toughen our political
posture and defend humanitarian principles and space, so that dedicated
humanitarian partners are able to get on with the job without fear for their
safety. 
sl/oa
TOP PHOTO: Collecting food aid
after an air drop in Leer, Unity State. CREDIT: ICRC/Flickr