The Uses and Abuses of Uncertainty: The Case of Turkey
by Richard Falk, 9 September 2016.
Webs of Uncertainty
One of the paradoxes
of the digital age with its real time awareness is the degree to which
information overloads clouds our imagination with cheaply achieved and false
clarity, which in political contexts is often the Mad Men work of selective
interpretation or deliberate manipulation. There are two types of uncertainty
that complicate our perceptions of reality. There is, first of all, the
ontological problems associated with a variety of uncertainties embedded in the
unresolvable complexities of our experience in such ways that we make important
decisions in the face of serious doubts. And secondly, there are often
predispositional problems associated with the sources we choose to rely upon,
the intrusion of our opinions, and under the influence of the worldview we
adopt that biases understanding, sometimes intentionally, but usually,
unwittingly.
of the digital age with its real time awareness is the degree to which
information overloads clouds our imagination with cheaply achieved and false
clarity, which in political contexts is often the Mad Men work of selective
interpretation or deliberate manipulation. There are two types of uncertainty
that complicate our perceptions of reality. There is, first of all, the
ontological problems associated with a variety of uncertainties embedded in the
unresolvable complexities of our experience in such ways that we make important
decisions in the face of serious doubts. And secondly, there are often
predispositional problems associated with the sources we choose to rely upon,
the intrusion of our opinions, and under the influence of the worldview we
adopt that biases understanding, sometimes intentionally, but usually,
unwittingly.
A fundamental aspect
of the human condition, philosophized brilliantly by Jacques Derrida, is a
pervasive good faith uncertainty and undecidability that confusingly overlaps
with the almost continuous need to act in the lifeworld, and then, despite
this, assume responsibility for whatever decisions are taken. In effect, this
makes the human condition ‘impossible’ because of this rooted unintelligibility
of our experience, depriving the most momentous decisions of our daily life of
any firm foundation in decidable fact. This realization is so deeply unsettling
as to make its denial a sign of normalcy. Most of us arrange our lives so that
this liminal uncertainty can be overlooked most of the time.
of the human condition, philosophized brilliantly by Jacques Derrida, is a
pervasive good faith uncertainty and undecidability that confusingly overlaps
with the almost continuous need to act in the lifeworld, and then, despite
this, assume responsibility for whatever decisions are taken. In effect, this
makes the human condition ‘impossible’ because of this rooted unintelligibility
of our experience, depriving the most momentous decisions of our daily life of
any firm foundation in decidable fact. This realization is so deeply unsettling
as to make its denial a sign of normalcy. Most of us arrange our lives so that
this liminal uncertainty can be overlooked most of the time.
What is equally
disturbing is the degree to which the technicians of public order are shaping
our collective future from behind such a dark veil. Of course, this has long
been true, but in the past the wider social consequences of disastrous choices
tended to be relatively local and the leaders depended on special powers. Now
leaders are expected to be ‘certain,’ as well as ‘objective,’ which means the
job description includes a willingness to wear a mask of certainty that covers
a face that is lined with tensions caused by acute doubt. Such expectations
produce dishonesty in the political arena, but like our effort to minimize
private uncertainty, many politicians are opportunistically able to treat the
uncertain as certain, and by so doing, we drift as a species toward the abyss.
disturbing is the degree to which the technicians of public order are shaping
our collective future from behind such a dark veil. Of course, this has long
been true, but in the past the wider social consequences of disastrous choices
tended to be relatively local and the leaders depended on special powers. Now
leaders are expected to be ‘certain,’ as well as ‘objective,’ which means the
job description includes a willingness to wear a mask of certainty that covers
a face that is lined with tensions caused by acute doubt. Such expectations
produce dishonesty in the political arena, but like our effort to minimize
private uncertainty, many politicians are opportunistically able to treat the
uncertain as certain, and by so doing, we drift as a species toward the abyss.
In modern times, the
magnitude of technological capabilities have been continuously generative of
unprecedented catastrophic dangers at the unfamiliarly grand scale of the
species as well as habitual human threats and pitfalls experienced at various
sub-species levels (nation, family, community). The warnings about climate
change have raised this issue to a heightened level of global awareness,
accompanied by a fatalistic denialism, as well as a set of politicized
responses that up to this point fall well below what is required for a
reasonable assurance of species sustainability.
magnitude of technological capabilities have been continuously generative of
unprecedented catastrophic dangers at the unfamiliarly grand scale of the
species as well as habitual human threats and pitfalls experienced at various
sub-species levels (nation, family, community). The warnings about climate
change have raised this issue to a heightened level of global awareness,
accompanied by a fatalistic denialism, as well as a set of politicized
responses that up to this point fall well below what is required for a
reasonable assurance of species sustainability.
The Turkish Internal
Consensus
Consensus
The experience of
political rupture is another circumstance that exposes claims of certainty as
pompous posturing, but also can bring forth distinctive forms of denialism that
pretends that what is rather certain is mired in the swamps of uncertainty, and
what is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, is to be treated as uncertain. Behind
this manipulation of uncertainty is a political agenda, usually unacknowledged.
political rupture is another circumstance that exposes claims of certainty as
pompous posturing, but also can bring forth distinctive forms of denialism that
pretends that what is rather certain is mired in the swamps of uncertainty, and
what is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, is to be treated as uncertain. Behind
this manipulation of uncertainty is a political agenda, usually unacknowledged.
These reflections
have been prompted by the various reactions to the failed July 15th coup
attempt in Turkey. Within Turkey there is a strong consensus (estimated at
between 80 and 90%) embracing most of the opposition forces in the country, but
with exceptions. The consensus includes even many embittered secular opponents
of Erdoğan’s leadership, believing that the attempted coup was the work of the
Fethullah Gülen movement and that its leader in residence in the United States
should be turned over to the Turkish government to face criminal prosecution
for involvement in crimes of terror, murder, treason. Above all, the consensus
proudly regards the defeat of the coup attempt as a great patriotic moment of
mass support for Turkish democracy. The second element in this consensus is
that the United States is somehow involved, and hence is almost certain to find
an excuse to avoid extradition or deportation, and distract attention by
harping on the importance of protecting the human rights of all Turks. The
third element is that it is essential that the Turkish government, to restore a
sense of security about the future, eliminate from various sectors of society
adherents and operatives of the movement led by Fethullah Gülen. The fourth
element is that the attempted coup was carried out in a bloody manner, killing
and wounding many innocent civilians, and failed only because initiated ahead
of schedule and poorly executed: Erdoğan escaped assassination by a mere 15 minutes
and was then able to mobilize quickly the citizenry to take over public spaces
in a bold, massive, and brave manner unprecedented in the context of coup
politics, and indicative of the depth of anti-coup sentiment among the Turkish
people and the intense support bestowed on Erdoğan for defeating the attempt
with polls showing his post-coup popularity to have surged to 70% or more. I
would maintain that this consensus in Turkey should be treated until reliably
refuted as a generally authoritative account of the relevant events, while
admitting that there are many complications that emerge if we look more deeply
into the full implication of each of these four elements.
have been prompted by the various reactions to the failed July 15th coup
attempt in Turkey. Within Turkey there is a strong consensus (estimated at
between 80 and 90%) embracing most of the opposition forces in the country, but
with exceptions. The consensus includes even many embittered secular opponents
of Erdoğan’s leadership, believing that the attempted coup was the work of the
Fethullah Gülen movement and that its leader in residence in the United States
should be turned over to the Turkish government to face criminal prosecution
for involvement in crimes of terror, murder, treason. Above all, the consensus
proudly regards the defeat of the coup attempt as a great patriotic moment of
mass support for Turkish democracy. The second element in this consensus is
that the United States is somehow involved, and hence is almost certain to find
an excuse to avoid extradition or deportation, and distract attention by
harping on the importance of protecting the human rights of all Turks. The
third element is that it is essential that the Turkish government, to restore a
sense of security about the future, eliminate from various sectors of society
adherents and operatives of the movement led by Fethullah Gülen. The fourth
element is that the attempted coup was carried out in a bloody manner, killing
and wounding many innocent civilians, and failed only because initiated ahead
of schedule and poorly executed: Erdoğan escaped assassination by a mere 15 minutes
and was then able to mobilize quickly the citizenry to take over public spaces
in a bold, massive, and brave manner unprecedented in the context of coup
politics, and indicative of the depth of anti-coup sentiment among the Turkish
people and the intense support bestowed on Erdoğan for defeating the attempt
with polls showing his post-coup popularity to have surged to 70% or more. I
would maintain that this consensus in Turkey should be treated until reliably
refuted as a generally authoritative account of the relevant events, while
admitting that there are many complications that emerge if we look more deeply
into the full implication of each of these four elements.
Erdoğan’s Critics:
Governmental and Civil Society
Governmental and Civil Society
In opposition to this
consensus, the world press and Western governmental reaction basically ignores
this consensus, and treats the coup events as if mired in uncertainty, an
outlook coupled with antipathy toward Erdoğan and an overall ambivalence toward
Turkey as a legitimate member of Western society despite its NATO membership
and its support for the struggle against ISIS. I think there are important
differences between the reasons underlying these attitudes that motivate
overseas secular and Gülen Turks (and their influential friends around the
world) and those that explain the somewhat convergent attitudes of Western
governments.
consensus, the world press and Western governmental reaction basically ignores
this consensus, and treats the coup events as if mired in uncertainty, an
outlook coupled with antipathy toward Erdoğan and an overall ambivalence toward
Turkey as a legitimate member of Western society despite its NATO membership
and its support for the struggle against ISIS. I think there are important
differences between the reasons underlying these attitudes that motivate
overseas secular and Gülen Turks (and their influential friends around the
world) and those that explain the somewhat convergent attitudes of Western
governments.
To consider the
prevailing attitudes of overseas Turks, it starts with hostility toward the
Erdoğan leadership, contending corruption, authoritarianism, a hidden Islamic
agenda, social conservatism, and a murderous war against Kurdish militants
associated with the PKK, as well as against the Syrian Kurdish militia (YPG).
This is enough to generate antipathy that expresses itself by either ignoring
or rejecting the consensus depicted above as dominating public opinion in
Turkey. In this sense, the role and effect of the Gülen movement is either
downplayed or problematized, and basically treated as either irrelevant or
unproven, and criticism is mounted against all efforts of the Turkish
government to rid itself and Turkish society of a secretive religious sect that
preaches a message of peace and moderation, while acting subversively and
violently. As well, the apparent links between Gülen and the CIA are not even
considered worthy of mention.
prevailing attitudes of overseas Turks, it starts with hostility toward the
Erdoğan leadership, contending corruption, authoritarianism, a hidden Islamic
agenda, social conservatism, and a murderous war against Kurdish militants
associated with the PKK, as well as against the Syrian Kurdish militia (YPG).
This is enough to generate antipathy that expresses itself by either ignoring
or rejecting the consensus depicted above as dominating public opinion in
Turkey. In this sense, the role and effect of the Gülen movement is either
downplayed or problematized, and basically treated as either irrelevant or
unproven, and criticism is mounted against all efforts of the Turkish
government to rid itself and Turkish society of a secretive religious sect that
preaches a message of peace and moderation, while acting subversively and
violently. As well, the apparent links between Gülen and the CIA are not even
considered worthy of mention.
When it comes to
Western governments the response also revolves around distrust of Erdoğan,
claiming that he is a Putinesque autocrat, but seeming to have their deepest
concerns because Turkey is an unreliable ally that no longer can be trusted to
follow the diktats of Washington. In this regard, Turkey’s
recent turn toward Russia and Iran, initiatives that preceded the coup attempt,
are viewed by the United States and Europe as geopolitically unwelcome. Already
by 2010 Turkey worried Washington by turning strongly against Israel and by
trying in collaboration with Brazil to resolve tensions with Iran by working
out an agreement to store Iran’s enriched uranium outside the country. Then, of
course, there was the tie to Fethullah Gülen and his movement, the dispersion
of influential Gülenists around the world that often impacted on public
official perceptions, and the mutually reinforcing distinct viewpoints
associated with Gülenists and secularists together have created an informal
international media counter-consensus to what is believed within Turkey.
Western governments the response also revolves around distrust of Erdoğan,
claiming that he is a Putinesque autocrat, but seeming to have their deepest
concerns because Turkey is an unreliable ally that no longer can be trusted to
follow the diktats of Washington. In this regard, Turkey’s
recent turn toward Russia and Iran, initiatives that preceded the coup attempt,
are viewed by the United States and Europe as geopolitically unwelcome. Already
by 2010 Turkey worried Washington by turning strongly against Israel and by
trying in collaboration with Brazil to resolve tensions with Iran by working
out an agreement to store Iran’s enriched uranium outside the country. Then, of
course, there was the tie to Fethullah Gülen and his movement, the dispersion
of influential Gülenists around the world that often impacted on public
official perceptions, and the mutually reinforcing distinct viewpoints
associated with Gülenists and secularists together have created an informal
international media counter-consensus to what is believed within Turkey.
I became personally
suspicious of the ties with the CIA initially in 2010 when Fethullah Gülen
personally and organizationally sided with Israel in the dispute with Turkey
arising from Israeli commando attack on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish passenger
vessel that was part of ‘a freedom flotilla’ seeking to break the blockade of
Gaza and deliver humanitarian assistance to the entrapped Palestinians. It
seemed a peculiar stand to be taken by a movement that purported to be devoted
to peace and the spread of Islamic values. Then a couple of years later when
invited to meet with some Gülen people in Istanbul my suspicions rose to near
certainty. We were shown a short documentary in which James Baker, Madeline
Albright, and Bill Clinton, that is, the reigning luminaries of both political
parties, made separate appearances in the film to heap praise on Fethullah
Gülen and his movement. I have been around long enough to know that this kind
of promotional documentary was not an innocent and spontaneous display of
enthusiasm for a secretive cult movement led by a mysterious Islamic preacher
by the most prominent members of the American political establishment. It could
not have happened without a strong government push, and one can only wonder
why.
suspicious of the ties with the CIA initially in 2010 when Fethullah Gülen
personally and organizationally sided with Israel in the dispute with Turkey
arising from Israeli commando attack on the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish passenger
vessel that was part of ‘a freedom flotilla’ seeking to break the blockade of
Gaza and deliver humanitarian assistance to the entrapped Palestinians. It
seemed a peculiar stand to be taken by a movement that purported to be devoted
to peace and the spread of Islamic values. Then a couple of years later when
invited to meet with some Gülen people in Istanbul my suspicions rose to near
certainty. We were shown a short documentary in which James Baker, Madeline
Albright, and Bill Clinton, that is, the reigning luminaries of both political
parties, made separate appearances in the film to heap praise on Fethullah
Gülen and his movement. I have been around long enough to know that this kind
of promotional documentary was not an innocent and spontaneous display of
enthusiasm for a secretive cult movement led by a mysterious Islamic preacher
by the most prominent members of the American political establishment. It could
not have happened without a strong government push, and one can only wonder
why.
I did not believe, at
the time, that these signs of governmental engagement was a prelude to a coup,
but rather in the nature of a Plan B option in the event that Erdoğan slipped
further from favor, and maybe served other purposes as well. There was also the
possibility that the Gülen schools all over the world were being used as an
effective means to penetrate some societies, such as those in Central Asia, places
where American intelligence was weak. It is reported that Graham Fuller, who
effectively backed Fethullah Gülen’s controversial request for a green card
over the opposition of the State Department and the FBI, believed that such an
educational network could be useful in gaining access to and recruits in
otherwise closed foreign societies. Fuller had been CIA station chief in
Istanbul before his retirement. Fuller claims a purity of intentions, and I
have seen no hard evidence to the contrary, but the strong personal connection
with Gülen given other confirming circumstantial evidence makes it reasonable
to be suspicious.
the time, that these signs of governmental engagement was a prelude to a coup,
but rather in the nature of a Plan B option in the event that Erdoğan slipped
further from favor, and maybe served other purposes as well. There was also the
possibility that the Gülen schools all over the world were being used as an
effective means to penetrate some societies, such as those in Central Asia, places
where American intelligence was weak. It is reported that Graham Fuller, who
effectively backed Fethullah Gülen’s controversial request for a green card
over the opposition of the State Department and the FBI, believed that such an
educational network could be useful in gaining access to and recruits in
otherwise closed foreign societies. Fuller had been CIA station chief in
Istanbul before his retirement. Fuller claims a purity of intentions, and I
have seen no hard evidence to the contrary, but the strong personal connection
with Gülen given other confirming circumstantial evidence makes it reasonable
to be suspicious.
As with the Turkish
critics, the Western governments ignore the context of the coup attempt, and
devote most of their attention to the post-coup crackdown on all suspected of
any Gülen affiliation. Also, during the coup, diplomatic support for Ankara was
not forthcoming, and a wait and see attitude seemed to carry the day. It may be
that the West supposed that the coup attempt was the work of discontented
Kemalists in the army and elsewhere, and its success would have been welcomed
(as with Egypt in 2013). This distancing angered the Turkish government and
people, and confirmed for many Turks suspicions about an American involvement
as well as its unwillingness to lend support to a popularly elected government.
critics, the Western governments ignore the context of the coup attempt, and
devote most of their attention to the post-coup crackdown on all suspected of
any Gülen affiliation. Also, during the coup, diplomatic support for Ankara was
not forthcoming, and a wait and see attitude seemed to carry the day. It may be
that the West supposed that the coup attempt was the work of discontented
Kemalists in the army and elsewhere, and its success would have been welcomed
(as with Egypt in 2013). This distancing angered the Turkish government and
people, and confirmed for many Turks suspicions about an American involvement
as well as its unwillingness to lend support to a popularly elected government.
These suspicions are
further confirmed by the evident reluctance of the United States to cooperate
fully in seeking to grant extradition, which it must be said, does face legal
obstacles in the best of circumstances. At the same time, if the U.S.
Government wanted to back Turkey in this post-coup attempt atmosphere it could
at least put Fethullah Gülen under temporary arrest or consider deporting him.
One can only imagine the American reaction if Turkey was seeming to shield a
person who was strongly believed by most Americans to be behind a coup attempt
or major terrorist incident in the United States. Legalistic excuses would not
begin to satisfy the American people in such a situation, and it will not
satisfy, much less convince the Turkish people and their leadership given the
near certainty, which has been attached to the allegation that Fethullah Gülen
masterminded the events of July 15th. It should be recalled that the Russian grant
of sanctuary to Edward Snowden was seen in the United States as an unfriendly
act that harmed relations between the countries even though the nature of his
alleged crime was distinctly ‘political’ in nature, and hence,
non-extradictable.
further confirmed by the evident reluctance of the United States to cooperate
fully in seeking to grant extradition, which it must be said, does face legal
obstacles in the best of circumstances. At the same time, if the U.S.
Government wanted to back Turkey in this post-coup attempt atmosphere it could
at least put Fethullah Gülen under temporary arrest or consider deporting him.
One can only imagine the American reaction if Turkey was seeming to shield a
person who was strongly believed by most Americans to be behind a coup attempt
or major terrorist incident in the United States. Legalistic excuses would not
begin to satisfy the American people in such a situation, and it will not
satisfy, much less convince the Turkish people and their leadership given the
near certainty, which has been attached to the allegation that Fethullah Gülen
masterminded the events of July 15th. It should be recalled that the Russian grant
of sanctuary to Edward Snowden was seen in the United States as an unfriendly
act that harmed relations between the countries even though the nature of his
alleged crime was distinctly ‘political’ in nature, and hence,
non-extradictable.
An Uncertain Future
Among the
uncertainties relevant to assessing the situation in Turkey is how the near
future unolds. Will the West live with a Turkey that claims the prerogative of
a sovereign state to pursue independently its own interests? Will the anti-
Erdoğan campaign carry the day in the struggle for the control of world public
opinion and shape Western policy toward Turkey? And, of course, will the
Turkish government conform formally and in good faith to due process and the
rule of law in the course of identifying those who can be reasonably charged
with direct and indirect complicity in the coup attempt? (It worth noting that
of the 55,000 or so who were originally subject to suspension or detention more
than half have been restored to employment or released, according to the
Minister of Interior). It is also most important, if Turkey is to regain
respect beyond its borders, that it not mingle its legitimate grievances
against the Gülen militants, operatives, and financial backers with separate
concerns it might have about the opinions and loyalty of pro-Kurdish activists
and ardent Kemalists.
uncertainties relevant to assessing the situation in Turkey is how the near
future unolds. Will the West live with a Turkey that claims the prerogative of
a sovereign state to pursue independently its own interests? Will the anti-
Erdoğan campaign carry the day in the struggle for the control of world public
opinion and shape Western policy toward Turkey? And, of course, will the
Turkish government conform formally and in good faith to due process and the
rule of law in the course of identifying those who can be reasonably charged
with direct and indirect complicity in the coup attempt? (It worth noting that
of the 55,000 or so who were originally subject to suspension or detention more
than half have been restored to employment or released, according to the
Minister of Interior). It is also most important, if Turkey is to regain
respect beyond its borders, that it not mingle its legitimate grievances
against the Gülen militants, operatives, and financial backers with separate
concerns it might have about the opinions and loyalty of pro-Kurdish activists
and ardent Kemalists.
This unfolding future
should gradually tell us which mix of certainties and uncertainties will govern
the Turkish internal and international future, and on that may hinge Turkey’s
security and overall regional and global orientation, including the future of
its relations with the United States, Europe, Russia, Iran, and its own
regional neighborhood. Perhaps, underneath the immediacies of the situation,
there are deeper forces at work in Turkey and elsewhere that are seeking to
find new alignments that befit the realities of the post-Cold War world order.
If this possibility were at the core of what is taking place, then it would not
be startling to witness Turkey pulling slowly away from NATO, and finding its
own path between East and West. At present, this seems unlikely as there
remains in Ankara a strong bonding with the West despite these recent strains,
but surely international relations have witnessed far stranger realignments
over the course of the past century.
should gradually tell us which mix of certainties and uncertainties will govern
the Turkish internal and international future, and on that may hinge Turkey’s
security and overall regional and global orientation, including the future of
its relations with the United States, Europe, Russia, Iran, and its own
regional neighborhood. Perhaps, underneath the immediacies of the situation,
there are deeper forces at work in Turkey and elsewhere that are seeking to
find new alignments that befit the realities of the post-Cold War world order.
If this possibility were at the core of what is taking place, then it would not
be startling to witness Turkey pulling slowly away from NATO, and finding its
own path between East and West. At present, this seems unlikely as there
remains in Ankara a strong bonding with the West despite these recent strains,
but surely international relations have witnessed far stranger realignments
over the course of the past century.
