Is Peace on the Horizon for Afghanistan?
Krishnadev Calamur, The Atlantic, Mar 28, 2018
An offer
of talks by the Ghani government was met with silence from the Taliban. That,
in itself, could be a good sign.
of talks by the Ghani government was met with silence from the Taliban. That,
in itself, could be a good sign.
 |
|
Mohammad
Ismail / Reuters |
Is it
time for optimism in Afghanistan?
time for optimism in Afghanistan?
On
February 28, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban peace talks
without preconditions as a way to end the nearly two-decade-long conflict in
his country. A month later, as delegates from more than 20 countries gathered
in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, to discuss ways to restore stability to
Afghanistan, there still hasn’t been a formal response from the Taliban.
Officials, meanwhile, have held out hope that the absence of a reply is cause
for optimism. “[W]e have not seen them reject the proposal, which … is in
itself a positive sign,” Alice Wells, the U.S. State Department official who
oversees South and Central Asia, said earlier this month at the U.S. Institute
for Peace. “And I would underscore our hope and expectation that the Taliban
leadership will analyze the proposal seriously and carefully.”
February 28, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani offered the Taliban peace talks
without preconditions as a way to end the nearly two-decade-long conflict in
his country. A month later, as delegates from more than 20 countries gathered
in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, to discuss ways to restore stability to
Afghanistan, there still hasn’t been a formal response from the Taliban.
Officials, meanwhile, have held out hope that the absence of a reply is cause
for optimism. “[W]e have not seen them reject the proposal, which … is in
itself a positive sign,” Alice Wells, the U.S. State Department official who
oversees South and Central Asia, said earlier this month at the U.S. Institute
for Peace. “And I would underscore our hope and expectation that the Taliban
leadership will analyze the proposal seriously and carefully.”
Ghani’s
unprecedented overture to the Taliban includes the offer of talks without
preconditions. It would also allow its members to run for government, release
Taliban fighters from prison, and require foreign forces to leave Afghanistan.
The Taliban, who ruled the country until the U.S.-led invasion in retaliation
for the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which was conceived and executed by
al-Qaeda, a group granted refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime), is reportedly
considering the offer. That has not prevented it from carrying out attacks
across the country—nor does it mean its leaders will accept the proposal.
unprecedented overture to the Taliban includes the offer of talks without
preconditions. It would also allow its members to run for government, release
Taliban fighters from prison, and require foreign forces to leave Afghanistan.
The Taliban, who ruled the country until the U.S.-led invasion in retaliation
for the attacks of September 11, 2001 (which was conceived and executed by
al-Qaeda, a group granted refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime), is reportedly
considering the offer. That has not prevented it from carrying out attacks
across the country—nor does it mean its leaders will accept the proposal.
Barnett
Rubin, an expert on the region at NYU, told me that Ghani’s offer is
significant in that it addresses many of the Taliban’s major concerns. But, he
said, it doesn’t address its main concern: its belief that Ghani lacks the
legitimacy to make such an offer. “The Afghan Taliban were not overthrown by
the Afghan government. They were overthrown by the United States,” Rubin said.
“And they want to talk to the United States. If they talk to the Afghan
government, to them, it’s like surrendering—because, to them, it means that it
was legitimate to overthrow them.”
Rubin, an expert on the region at NYU, told me that Ghani’s offer is
significant in that it addresses many of the Taliban’s major concerns. But, he
said, it doesn’t address its main concern: its belief that Ghani lacks the
legitimacy to make such an offer. “The Afghan Taliban were not overthrown by
the Afghan government. They were overthrown by the United States,” Rubin said.
“And they want to talk to the United States. If they talk to the Afghan
government, to them, it’s like surrendering—because, to them, it means that it
was legitimate to overthrow them.”
And yet,
as The New York Times reported
Tuesday, the mood at the Tashkent conference, the latest international effort
to bring peace to Afghanistan, was “unusually optimistic.” Ghani’s offer to the
Taliban came at a similar conference in Kabul bringing together 20 countries.
There are also several other mechanisms in place working towards peace in
Afghanistan; many involve a combination of its neighbors and either the United
States or Russia. Most, but not all, include the Afghan government. None
include the Taliban.
as The New York Times reported
Tuesday, the mood at the Tashkent conference, the latest international effort
to bring peace to Afghanistan, was “unusually optimistic.” Ghani’s offer to the
Taliban came at a similar conference in Kabul bringing together 20 countries.
There are also several other mechanisms in place working towards peace in
Afghanistan; many involve a combination of its neighbors and either the United
States or Russia. Most, but not all, include the Afghan government. None
include the Taliban.
After
years of criticizing America’s war in Afghanistan, President Trump followed
his two predecessors by sending U.S. soldiers to the country. His South Asia
strategy involved pressuring Pakistan, which he accused of giving
“safe haven to the terrorists we hunt,” by suspending security assistance to Islamabad.
He also wants India to do more. As part of this effort, the U.S. is helping
Afghan forces fight the Taliban “in order to
drive them to the negotiating table.”
years of criticizing America’s war in Afghanistan, President Trump followed
his two predecessors by sending U.S. soldiers to the country. His South Asia
strategy involved pressuring Pakistan, which he accused of giving
“safe haven to the terrorists we hunt,” by suspending security assistance to Islamabad.
He also wants India to do more. As part of this effort, the U.S. is helping
Afghan forces fight the Taliban “in order to
drive them to the negotiating table.”
The
Taliban remains the most powerful insurgent group in Afghanistan. Its
membership is Afghan (unlike the other groups, whose ranks include many foreign
fighters), it enjoys some support among the population, and controls about
one-third of the country—more territory than at any point since the U.S.-led
invasion in 2001. (The Afghan government controls all the major population
centers.)
Taliban remains the most powerful insurgent group in Afghanistan. Its
membership is Afghan (unlike the other groups, whose ranks include many foreign
fighters), it enjoys some support among the population, and controls about
one-third of the country—more territory than at any point since the U.S.-led
invasion in 2001. (The Afghan government controls all the major population
centers.)
What all
these international efforts underscore is that while the international
community wants a reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the
Taliban, many global powers who have meddled in the country for decades—if not
centuries—still influence what happens within its borders. U.S. Army General
John Nicholson, the senior-most U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told the BBC last week
that weapons seized from Taliban fighters were allegedly supplied by Russia.
(Russia, whose painful history in Afghanistan dates back to the 19th century,
has denied this.) Russia is reportedly backing the Taliban in order to fight
the Islamic State, which has gained a foothold in the country. Hanif Atmar,
Afghanistan’s national-security adviser, said last week in Washington that
Kabul disagreed with Moscow’s distinction “between good and bad terrorists.”
these international efforts underscore is that while the international
community wants a reconciliation process between the Afghan government and the
Taliban, many global powers who have meddled in the country for decades—if not
centuries—still influence what happens within its borders. U.S. Army General
John Nicholson, the senior-most U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told the BBC last week
that weapons seized from Taliban fighters were allegedly supplied by Russia.
(Russia, whose painful history in Afghanistan dates back to the 19th century,
has denied this.) Russia is reportedly backing the Taliban in order to fight
the Islamic State, which has gained a foothold in the country. Hanif Atmar,
Afghanistan’s national-security adviser, said last week in Washington that
Kabul disagreed with Moscow’s distinction “between good and bad terrorists.”
“Of
course, we’ve been provided assurance that [the] Taliban will not be provided
with weapons and resources,” he said. “We will welcome that assurance and we
would like to see that in practice.”
course, we’ve been provided assurance that [the] Taliban will not be provided
with weapons and resources,” he said. “We will welcome that assurance and we
would like to see that in practice.”
Afghanistan’s
other neighbors have their own interests—interests that are often at odds with
one another, as well as with the Afghan government. Pakistan, the Taliban’s
ally and major benefactor, is afraid of being hemmed in between two unfriendly
neighbors, India and Afghanistan. India, in turn, is nervous
about the prospect of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan
because they provide a semblance of stability to the region. Iran, which
borders Afghanistan in the west, is also supporting the Taliban. China sees
stability in the country as a major necessity if the belt-and-road initiative,
its massive infrastructure project, is to succeed. China is also nervous about
the presence of Uighur separatists inside Afghanistan; ditto for Uzbekistan,
which is battling its own Islamist militancy.
other neighbors have their own interests—interests that are often at odds with
one another, as well as with the Afghan government. Pakistan, the Taliban’s
ally and major benefactor, is afraid of being hemmed in between two unfriendly
neighbors, India and Afghanistan. India, in turn, is nervous
about the prospect of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan
because they provide a semblance of stability to the region. Iran, which
borders Afghanistan in the west, is also supporting the Taliban. China sees
stability in the country as a major necessity if the belt-and-road initiative,
its massive infrastructure project, is to succeed. China is also nervous about
the presence of Uighur separatists inside Afghanistan; ditto for Uzbekistan,
which is battling its own Islamist militancy.
Atmar
said the number of foreign fighters had increased in the country, as the number
of international forces fell over the past four years. The government’s goal,
he said, was to “separate the Afghan Taliban from the foreign fighters. And we
can make peace with them because they are Afghans—if they are interested in
peace.”
said the number of foreign fighters had increased in the country, as the number
of international forces fell over the past four years. The government’s goal,
he said, was to “separate the Afghan Taliban from the foreign fighters. And we
can make peace with them because they are Afghans—if they are interested in
peace.”
If the
Taliban accepted Ghani’s offer of talks (a big if), it would mark the first
time since 2010 that the group’s leadership met with Afghan government
officials. That earlier attempt failed
after Pakistan played spoiler by arresting a key member of the Taliban
leadership. Subsequent efforts faltered as well. Hamid Karzai, the previous
Afghan president, tried in 2014 to talk secretly to the Taliban, but the Obama
administration blocked his attempts. Karzai himself had
opposed previous U.S. attempts to negotiate with the insurgents. The
U.S. role in Afghanistan itself has changed since 2001. At the height of the
war on terrorism, there were about 100,000 U.S. troops in the country. Today,
that figure is down to about 15,000 troops who work with the Afghan military to
fight the Taliban and international terrorist groups, including ISIS.
Taliban accepted Ghani’s offer of talks (a big if), it would mark the first
time since 2010 that the group’s leadership met with Afghan government
officials. That earlier attempt failed
after Pakistan played spoiler by arresting a key member of the Taliban
leadership. Subsequent efforts faltered as well. Hamid Karzai, the previous
Afghan president, tried in 2014 to talk secretly to the Taliban, but the Obama
administration blocked his attempts. Karzai himself had
opposed previous U.S. attempts to negotiate with the insurgents. The
U.S. role in Afghanistan itself has changed since 2001. At the height of the
war on terrorism, there were about 100,000 U.S. troops in the country. Today,
that figure is down to about 15,000 troops who work with the Afghan military to
fight the Taliban and international terrorist groups, including ISIS.
Atmar,
the Afghan national-security adviser, cast doubt over whether the Taliban were
still monolithic, arguing that because it lacks the strong leadership it once
had, it is brought together by foreign influence. “There are leaders now among
the Taliban … that question the continuation of the conflict,” he said. “And
they are certainly in contact with our peace council and with the government,
and they are asking for a process whereby they and their families are protected
to engage in peace.” But, he said, there are also elements that are irreconcilable.
The Afghan government, he said, would engage with one group and fight the
other.
the Afghan national-security adviser, cast doubt over whether the Taliban were
still monolithic, arguing that because it lacks the strong leadership it once
had, it is brought together by foreign influence. “There are leaders now among
the Taliban … that question the continuation of the conflict,” he said. “And
they are certainly in contact with our peace council and with the government,
and they are asking for a process whereby they and their families are protected
to engage in peace.” But, he said, there are also elements that are irreconcilable.
The Afghan government, he said, would engage with one group and fight the
other.
But
Rubin, who previously worked as a U.S. diplomat and talked to the Taliban, said
the militants are less fragmented than they are perceived to be. “There’s a stereotype
about the Taliban that they’re a bunch of fractious tribesmen, but it’s not
true,” he said. “They do speak with one voice. In fact, they are much more
consistent in their policy positions than either the U.S. or Afghan
governments.”
Rubin, who previously worked as a U.S. diplomat and talked to the Taliban, said
the militants are less fragmented than they are perceived to be. “There’s a stereotype
about the Taliban that they’re a bunch of fractious tribesmen, but it’s not
true,” he said. “They do speak with one voice. In fact, they are much more
consistent in their policy positions than either the U.S. or Afghan
governments.”
