IS THE AFRICAN FARMER AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?
By Dr Michael Njume Ebong*, Chede
Cameroon. Puzzling statistics: Africa’s
agricultural performance in the past several decades exhibits puzzling
statistics. The region accounts for more than half of the world’s total uncultivated
arable land, and has about 60%t of its population engaged in farming (including
livestock and fisheries), that is relatively more farmers than any other
continent. And yet Africa imports more food per capita than other developing
regions. The only region still agonizing
for an agricultural revolution, Africa is also the most troubled by recurrent
food crises and food insecurity, according to data by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In 2011 Africa imported food products worth
USD 43 billion against agricultural commodity exports worth only USD 34
billion.
Cameroon. Puzzling statistics: Africa’s
agricultural performance in the past several decades exhibits puzzling
statistics. The region accounts for more than half of the world’s total uncultivated
arable land, and has about 60%t of its population engaged in farming (including
livestock and fisheries), that is relatively more farmers than any other
continent. And yet Africa imports more food per capita than other developing
regions. The only region still agonizing
for an agricultural revolution, Africa is also the most troubled by recurrent
food crises and food insecurity, according to data by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In 2011 Africa imported food products worth
USD 43 billion against agricultural commodity exports worth only USD 34
billion.
The World Bank’s 2008
World Development Report entitled Agriculture
for Development, revealed that while agriculture contributed upwards of 30%
to overall African GDP from 1980 to 2000, African public spending on the sector
was astonishingly low at barely 4% per annum or less than half of similar
expenditure in other developing regions during the same period. This comparison
would imply that African countries are still to wake up in recognizing the
centrality of agricultural development as driver of economic growth and poverty
reduction, as so clearly demonstrated in the past decades by China and India
for example.
World Development Report entitled Agriculture
for Development, revealed that while agriculture contributed upwards of 30%
to overall African GDP from 1980 to 2000, African public spending on the sector
was astonishingly low at barely 4% per annum or less than half of similar
expenditure in other developing regions during the same period. This comparison
would imply that African countries are still to wake up in recognizing the
centrality of agricultural development as driver of economic growth and poverty
reduction, as so clearly demonstrated in the past decades by China and India
for example.
This apparent neglect
by African countries to use agriculture as their development springboard is
further evident in other data, which show for example that while total African
GDP grew annually by about 6% from 2000 to 2010, agricultural GDP grew only by
3.4%, according to a 2014 Deutcshe Bank publication entitled Agricultural value chains in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Such dismal performance in a sector with virtually limitless
development potentials and which should give African countries unique
comparative advantages in world agricultural trade would seem to explain the
region’s increasing food-import dependence and why its poverty rates have
remained stubbornly high over the decades since the poor are concentrated in
agriculture.
by African countries to use agriculture as their development springboard is
further evident in other data, which show for example that while total African
GDP grew annually by about 6% from 2000 to 2010, agricultural GDP grew only by
3.4%, according to a 2014 Deutcshe Bank publication entitled Agricultural value chains in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Such dismal performance in a sector with virtually limitless
development potentials and which should give African countries unique
comparative advantages in world agricultural trade would seem to explain the
region’s increasing food-import dependence and why its poverty rates have
remained stubbornly high over the decades since the poor are concentrated in
agriculture.
Why this
under-performance ? Mainstream literature on this subject
faults African governments for under-investment and sometimes misinvestment in
agriculture. The lack of crucial infrastructure, especially inter-village and farm-to-market
roads integrating farming communities with market hubs; effective
farmer-enabling institutions and policies (e.g. acquisition and distribution of
farm inputs or financial services for the farmers); and urban-oriented
allocation of public investments, are singled out as some of the causes for Africa’s
regressive agricultural statistics.
under-performance ? Mainstream literature on this subject
faults African governments for under-investment and sometimes misinvestment in
agriculture. The lack of crucial infrastructure, especially inter-village and farm-to-market
roads integrating farming communities with market hubs; effective
farmer-enabling institutions and policies (e.g. acquisition and distribution of
farm inputs or financial services for the farmers); and urban-oriented
allocation of public investments, are singled out as some of the causes for Africa’s
regressive agricultural statistics.
African farmers (mostly village-based smallholders) are
equally faulted for having the lowest productivity per farmer and per hectare
in comparison with farmers in other regions. For example, whereas cereal yields
on African farms average less than 2 tonnes per hectare, farmers in other
regions achieve yields averaging 6 tonnes per hectare. Productivity on Africa’s
cocoa and coffee farms averages 500 kg per hectare compared to yields as high
as 3000 kg per hectare in some Asian and Latin American countries. Relatively
lower productivity characterises practically all crops and related activities,
and explains in large part why Africa, with its relatively more agricultural
land and more numerous farmers, is nonetheless the only region that still
cannot feed itself or use agriculture as a powerful lever for industrial
takeoff and substantial poverty reduction in the rural heartland.
equally faulted for having the lowest productivity per farmer and per hectare
in comparison with farmers in other regions. For example, whereas cereal yields
on African farms average less than 2 tonnes per hectare, farmers in other
regions achieve yields averaging 6 tonnes per hectare. Productivity on Africa’s
cocoa and coffee farms averages 500 kg per hectare compared to yields as high
as 3000 kg per hectare in some Asian and Latin American countries. Relatively
lower productivity characterises practically all crops and related activities,
and explains in large part why Africa, with its relatively more agricultural
land and more numerous farmers, is nonetheless the only region that still
cannot feed itself or use agriculture as a powerful lever for industrial
takeoff and substantial poverty reduction in the rural heartland.
Low productivity is
attributed to severely limited applications of science and technology to
agriculture, especially research and development (R&D) innovations to
generate high-yielding and pest-resistant crop varieties. R&D played a crucial role in revolutionizing
smallholder agriculture in China, India, Indonesia and Thailand for example. Because
it accounts for close to 50% of total factor productivity, R&D is indispensable
to the transformation of subsistence agriculture, such as predominates in
African villages, into commercial farm enterprises able to engage the market
efficiently, effectively and sustainably on profitable terms.
attributed to severely limited applications of science and technology to
agriculture, especially research and development (R&D) innovations to
generate high-yielding and pest-resistant crop varieties. R&D played a crucial role in revolutionizing
smallholder agriculture in China, India, Indonesia and Thailand for example. Because
it accounts for close to 50% of total factor productivity, R&D is indispensable
to the transformation of subsistence agriculture, such as predominates in
African villages, into commercial farm enterprises able to engage the market
efficiently, effectively and sustainably on profitable terms.
And yet, here too, African countries have lagged behind,
alarmingly. Their combined investment in agricultural R&D in the last
decade was statistically insignificant – less than 0.1% of similar investment
in other regions. Limited mechanized options and tools equally inhibit
productivity.It is a main reason farming does not appeal to the youth, who
recoil from the manual drudgery it entails using only a matchete and hoe. Indeed,
a tractor is a very rare asset in a typical African village, so are animal
traction solutions. Crop irrigation, which can significantly raise the
productivity of some crops, covers barely 4% of Africa’s 50 million or so small
farms, compared to 40% in some high-performing developing countries. Yet
another productivity drawback is irregular or non-existent application of farm
inputs to protect plants and boost production.
alarmingly. Their combined investment in agricultural R&D in the last
decade was statistically insignificant – less than 0.1% of similar investment
in other regions. Limited mechanized options and tools equally inhibit
productivity.It is a main reason farming does not appeal to the youth, who
recoil from the manual drudgery it entails using only a matchete and hoe. Indeed,
a tractor is a very rare asset in a typical African village, so are animal
traction solutions. Crop irrigation, which can significantly raise the
productivity of some crops, covers barely 4% of Africa’s 50 million or so small
farms, compared to 40% in some high-performing developing countries. Yet
another productivity drawback is irregular or non-existent application of farm
inputs to protect plants and boost production.
Further, some major donor countries are held partly responsible
for the agony of Africa’s agriculture. The share of agriculture in official
development assistance (ODA) declined in relative terms from 18% in 1979 to 3.5%
in 2004, and in absolute terms from USD 8 billion in 1984 to USD3.4 billion in
2004, most of it going to support the Asian green revolution. Powerful
agricultural interests in some donor countries also lobby their governments
against the use of development aid to support agriculture in their major export
markets concentrated in Africa. As can be seen, therefore, the African farmer
appears trapped in a fatal vise, from within and without. To this already stark situation should be factored
still unknown climate change perils looming on the horizon of African
agriculture.
for the agony of Africa’s agriculture. The share of agriculture in official
development assistance (ODA) declined in relative terms from 18% in 1979 to 3.5%
in 2004, and in absolute terms from USD 8 billion in 1984 to USD3.4 billion in
2004, most of it going to support the Asian green revolution. Powerful
agricultural interests in some donor countries also lobby their governments
against the use of development aid to support agriculture in their major export
markets concentrated in Africa. As can be seen, therefore, the African farmer
appears trapped in a fatal vise, from within and without. To this already stark situation should be factored
still unknown climate change perils looming on the horizon of African
agriculture.
The struggle for farmer visibility and
recognition : Yet, as desperate as it may seem, the
foregoing is only the tip of the iceberg threatening to sink the African
farmer. The hard question is this :
if freed from the impediments currently binding him as noted above, can the
African farmer spark a green revolution? We partly addressed this question in a
2007 article entitled Le paysan camerounais est le moteur de la
croissance économique (www.chede.org), which drew attention to the blurred
economic identity of the Cameroonian village farmer toiling daily on the
informal margins of the « modern » economic sector predominant in the
cities and usually favoured by public policies and investment strategies. We
argued that the extensive land, farm, and livestock holdings of farmers in the
Cameroonian village landscape accounting for about 60% of national employment
and generating upwards of 30% of GDP were of such national scale and weal that
they justified ranking the Cameroonian smallholders collectively as the most
important local investor.
recognition : Yet, as desperate as it may seem, the
foregoing is only the tip of the iceberg threatening to sink the African
farmer. The hard question is this :
if freed from the impediments currently binding him as noted above, can the
African farmer spark a green revolution? We partly addressed this question in a
2007 article entitled Le paysan camerounais est le moteur de la
croissance économique (www.chede.org), which drew attention to the blurred
economic identity of the Cameroonian village farmer toiling daily on the
informal margins of the « modern » economic sector predominant in the
cities and usually favoured by public policies and investment strategies. We
argued that the extensive land, farm, and livestock holdings of farmers in the
Cameroonian village landscape accounting for about 60% of national employment
and generating upwards of 30% of GDP were of such national scale and weal that
they justified ranking the Cameroonian smallholders collectively as the most
important local investor.
And yet, this Cameroonian village-based investor lacks an
economic identity card. For example, is he together with his farming household
a small and medium-size enterprise (SME) on equal footing with SMEs in the
cities in terms of government largesse? This village investor is for example silenced
in the Cameroon investment code, excluded from the Cameroon business and
investment forums, and does not enjoy the same red-carpet treatment usually
rolled out for foreign investors. This
observation applies to smallholders in
other African countries who struggle daily
for economic visibility and government policy recognition. We probe this
important issue further below by comparing the farmer’s asset position relative
to those of other productive forces in a typical African country.
economic identity card. For example, is he together with his farming household
a small and medium-size enterprise (SME) on equal footing with SMEs in the
cities in terms of government largesse? This village investor is for example silenced
in the Cameroon investment code, excluded from the Cameroon business and
investment forums, and does not enjoy the same red-carpet treatment usually
rolled out for foreign investors. This
observation applies to smallholders in
other African countries who struggle daily
for economic visibility and government policy recognition. We probe this
important issue further below by comparing the farmer’s asset position relative
to those of other productive forces in a typical African country.
City-village pattern of distribution of
normative public goods and services : As currently structured, the national workforce of a typical
African country can be subdivided into three segments, as follows :
(1) public
and parapublic sector which accounts for about 3 %
average of the national workforce but
commands (by our guess-estimate) 30% on
average of its intellectual capital or brain power (defined in this context as
the critical mass of well educated, trained, skilled, and experienced personnel
in active employment), and has an average age of 35 years; (2) the formal and informal business class
including the extractive, industry and service sectors, as well as large
agribusiness companies and civil society and religious organizations, which
together represent about 37% of the total workforce, account for about 50%
of its intellectual capital, generates much of the direct tax and customs
revenues going to state coffers, and has a 40-year median age ; and (3) village-based smallholders who
represent 60% of the workforce in Cameroon and as much as 80% in some other
African countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, or Mozambique, account for 20%
of the interllectual capital of the national workforce, and has an average age
of 55 years (60 years in Cameroon).
normative public goods and services : As currently structured, the national workforce of a typical
African country can be subdivided into three segments, as follows :
(1) public
and parapublic sector which accounts for about 3 %
average of the national workforce but
commands (by our guess-estimate) 30% on
average of its intellectual capital or brain power (defined in this context as
the critical mass of well educated, trained, skilled, and experienced personnel
in active employment), and has an average age of 35 years; (2) the formal and informal business class
including the extractive, industry and service sectors, as well as large
agribusiness companies and civil society and religious organizations, which
together represent about 37% of the total workforce, account for about 50%
of its intellectual capital, generates much of the direct tax and customs
revenues going to state coffers, and has a 40-year median age ; and (3) village-based smallholders who
represent 60% of the workforce in Cameroon and as much as 80% in some other
African countries such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, or Mozambique, account for 20%
of the interllectual capital of the national workforce, and has an average age
of 55 years (60 years in Cameroon).
National workforce segments 1 and 2 above are mostly
city-based except for decentralized services, are thoroughly well trained for
their professions, and are relatively young. The farmers’ segment 3 is
village-based, is the least educated, and is much older than the other
workforce segments. A cursory analysis of the present relative distribution of normative public goods and services among
these three segments (e.g. infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and
energy supply networks ; transport and communication services; social
services especially healthcare and educational facilities; safety and security
services ; administrative
services ; etc), which all the three workforce segments need in order to
function efficiently and productively, shows that on average 70% of the total stock
of such goods and services are urban-centred and benefit mostly the public and
business sectors, while the more numerically important farmers segment 3 is
supported by only 30%. This is at
present the rough urban-rural or city-village capital assets distribution ratio
in most African countries, including Cameroon, with respect in particular to
total road network coverage, which is fundamental to agricultural production
and productivity. But for those village farmers lucky to be located near
inter-city expressways, much of the road network available to the farmers is unpaved
and of such poor quality that it is almost useless if not too dangerous to use in
the rainy seasons.
city-based except for decentralized services, are thoroughly well trained for
their professions, and are relatively young. The farmers’ segment 3 is
village-based, is the least educated, and is much older than the other
workforce segments. A cursory analysis of the present relative distribution of normative public goods and services among
these three segments (e.g. infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and
energy supply networks ; transport and communication services; social
services especially healthcare and educational facilities; safety and security
services ; administrative
services ; etc), which all the three workforce segments need in order to
function efficiently and productively, shows that on average 70% of the total stock
of such goods and services are urban-centred and benefit mostly the public and
business sectors, while the more numerically important farmers segment 3 is
supported by only 30%. This is at
present the rough urban-rural or city-village capital assets distribution ratio
in most African countries, including Cameroon, with respect in particular to
total road network coverage, which is fundamental to agricultural production
and productivity. But for those village farmers lucky to be located near
inter-city expressways, much of the road network available to the farmers is unpaved
and of such poor quality that it is almost useless if not too dangerous to use in
the rainy seasons.
Inverted pyramid: This inverted pyramid of national capital
stock distribution between the urban and rural sectors is typical of
industrialized countries but difficult to justify in predominantly
agriculture-based economies mostly found in Africa. It operates in conflict
with African national constitutions which guarantee equal and equitable
development rights and opportunities for all citizens irrespective of station
and sector. It sidelines the farmer
operationally and psychologically because it trivializes farming as a worthy
profession entitled to the same robust government support enjoyed by other
city-based professions. It deprives village farming households of young muscle
and intellect because it encourages mass migrations from the villages to the
cities and to distant lands abroad – to the point where some countries such as
Angola or Gabon currently have close to 80% of their total populations living
in cities and townships. Any surprise then that these countries’ agriculture
sector is in deep trouble and their food import bills are skyrocketing ?
stock distribution between the urban and rural sectors is typical of
industrialized countries but difficult to justify in predominantly
agriculture-based economies mostly found in Africa. It operates in conflict
with African national constitutions which guarantee equal and equitable
development rights and opportunities for all citizens irrespective of station
and sector. It sidelines the farmer
operationally and psychologically because it trivializes farming as a worthy
profession entitled to the same robust government support enjoyed by other
city-based professions. It deprives village farming households of young muscle
and intellect because it encourages mass migrations from the villages to the
cities and to distant lands abroad – to the point where some countries such as
Angola or Gabon currently have close to 80% of their total populations living
in cities and townships. Any surprise then that these countries’ agriculture
sector is in deep trouble and their food import bills are skyrocketing ?
To that should be
added other factors which kill farmer motivation and ambition, such as the lack of the same professional benefits
enjoyed by public and private sector personnel, especially social security policies
including pension and health insurance schemes, dependable healthcare services,
risk insurance against crop failures and epidemics, ready access to fmarkets
and technology packages, and first-class quality training and refresher programmes.
In Cameroon, for example, prestigious elite schools in the likes of ENAM or
IRIC exist for public sector employees and numerous management schools for the business
class, but hardly any for the more numerous farmers, excepting MINADER’s sparse
and nondescript network of agricultural colleges and University faculties of
agriculture strong on theory but weak on practice, with almost no technology conveyor
belts to the farming population. Predictably, most of the graduates aspire not
to become farmers but to work as
government civil servants in air-conditioned offices in the cities. Which implies that the development of African
agriculture has been abandoned to an old and illiterate village spent force
with no succession plan in view. No wonder therefore that the African farmer
may be considered an endangered species. So how can this African farmer compete
with wealthy and heavily subsidized farmers in the developed countries under
the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trading system or the African
and European Union Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)?
added other factors which kill farmer motivation and ambition, such as the lack of the same professional benefits
enjoyed by public and private sector personnel, especially social security policies
including pension and health insurance schemes, dependable healthcare services,
risk insurance against crop failures and epidemics, ready access to fmarkets
and technology packages, and first-class quality training and refresher programmes.
In Cameroon, for example, prestigious elite schools in the likes of ENAM or
IRIC exist for public sector employees and numerous management schools for the business
class, but hardly any for the more numerous farmers, excepting MINADER’s sparse
and nondescript network of agricultural colleges and University faculties of
agriculture strong on theory but weak on practice, with almost no technology conveyor
belts to the farming population. Predictably, most of the graduates aspire not
to become farmers but to work as
government civil servants in air-conditioned offices in the cities. Which implies that the development of African
agriculture has been abandoned to an old and illiterate village spent force
with no succession plan in view. No wonder therefore that the African farmer
may be considered an endangered species. So how can this African farmer compete
with wealthy and heavily subsidized farmers in the developed countries under
the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trading system or the African
and European Union Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)?
The village: Additionally, the African farmer works in a village setting
which in some countries such as Cameroon lacks administrative codification as a
development unit in its own right, similar to the administrative demarcation of
regions, divisions, subdivisions, districts and communes. Try very hard for
example to find the village mentioned anywhere in the Cameroon Constitution.
And whereas some countries have entire Ministries in charge of urban
development and planning, to the best of our knowledge no African country has a
similar Ministry exclusively responsible for village development and planning. The
village is equally missing in the most authoritative publications on this
subject by the World Bank, FAO or IFAD, which rarely see the strong link
between Africa’s poor agricultural performance and the appalling conditions in
African villages due to their inaccessibility challenges. Appending
« rural development » to the Ministry of Agriculture misses the imperative
of comprehensive and integrated village modernization. This should be the prime
mission of all development ministries in a context where smallholder agriculture
is recognized, supported and moved as the engine of national economic and
industrial growth and equalizer of development opportunities and income
distribution nation-wide.
which in some countries such as Cameroon lacks administrative codification as a
development unit in its own right, similar to the administrative demarcation of
regions, divisions, subdivisions, districts and communes. Try very hard for
example to find the village mentioned anywhere in the Cameroon Constitution.
And whereas some countries have entire Ministries in charge of urban
development and planning, to the best of our knowledge no African country has a
similar Ministry exclusively responsible for village development and planning. The
village is equally missing in the most authoritative publications on this
subject by the World Bank, FAO or IFAD, which rarely see the strong link
between Africa’s poor agricultural performance and the appalling conditions in
African villages due to their inaccessibility challenges. Appending
« rural development » to the Ministry of Agriculture misses the imperative
of comprehensive and integrated village modernization. This should be the prime
mission of all development ministries in a context where smallholder agriculture
is recognized, supported and moved as the engine of national economic and
industrial growth and equalizer of development opportunities and income
distribution nation-wide.
We argued that case some ten years ago in a 2004 study
entitled Agricultural expansion for
poverty eradication in Africa : rethinking strategies from a village
perspective – case study of Cameroon, in which we considered African
villages as the foundation blocks of nation building. Building a nation is like
building a house – you must start from the foundation, comprising agriculture as
the economic foundation and the village as the socio-political foundation. Thus
comprehensive development of African villages – with special focus on the modernization and
promotion of their cultural heritage – should be the entrypoint for the
modernization and expansion of smallholder agriculture. Our villages need to
regain their colourful cultural effervescence punctuated with harvest festivals
of yesteryears. That is what will attract our numerous jobless youth now in the
cities to agriculture. In other words, Africa’s agricultural productivity
revolution will have to be engineered in the villages, not in the cities. The first assignment to that end should be to
restore pride, prestige, self-esteem and self-confidence to the village farmer,
recognize his contribution as the first indigenous investor and foremost
architect in nation building at foundation level, and give him the hardware and
software packages he needs to perform our long-awaited agricultural miracle.
entitled Agricultural expansion for
poverty eradication in Africa : rethinking strategies from a village
perspective – case study of Cameroon, in which we considered African
villages as the foundation blocks of nation building. Building a nation is like
building a house – you must start from the foundation, comprising agriculture as
the economic foundation and the village as the socio-political foundation. Thus
comprehensive development of African villages – with special focus on the modernization and
promotion of their cultural heritage – should be the entrypoint for the
modernization and expansion of smallholder agriculture. Our villages need to
regain their colourful cultural effervescence punctuated with harvest festivals
of yesteryears. That is what will attract our numerous jobless youth now in the
cities to agriculture. In other words, Africa’s agricultural productivity
revolution will have to be engineered in the villages, not in the cities. The first assignment to that end should be to
restore pride, prestige, self-esteem and self-confidence to the village farmer,
recognize his contribution as the first indigenous investor and foremost
architect in nation building at foundation level, and give him the hardware and
software packages he needs to perform our long-awaited agricultural miracle.
*Board
Chair
Chair
Chede
Cooperative Union
Cooperative Union
651 67 86
02/679 54 89 29
02/679 54 89 29
www.chede.org
