China Dropped Its One-Child Policy. So Why Aren’t Chinese Women Having More Babies?
By Leta Hong Fincherf, The New York Times, February 20, 2018
In late
2015, when China eased its decades-long policy limiting most couples to having
only one child, some heralded the change as a move toward greater reproductive
freedom. But the government was only embarking on another grand experiment in
population engineering: This time it was urging women — though only the right
sort — to reproduce for China.
2015, when China eased its decades-long policy limiting most couples to having
only one child, some heralded the change as a move toward greater reproductive
freedom. But the government was only embarking on another grand experiment in
population engineering: This time it was urging women — though only the right
sort — to reproduce for China.
Credit
Marta Monteiro
Marta Monteiro
The
authorities in Beijing seemed terrified that plummeting birthrates, an aging
population and a shrinking
labor force might undermine the results of years of double-digit
growth rates, and threaten the political legitimacy of the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (C.C.P.). So they began allowing most married couples to have
two children. They hoped that the new policy would bring three million
additional births a year through 2020 and add more than 30
million workers to the labor force by 2050.
authorities in Beijing seemed terrified that plummeting birthrates, an aging
population and a shrinking
labor force might undermine the results of years of double-digit
growth rates, and threaten the political legitimacy of the ruling Chinese
Communist Party (C.C.P.). So they began allowing most married couples to have
two children. They hoped that the new policy would bring three million
additional births a year through 2020 and add more than 30
million workers to the labor force by 2050.
But there
has been no baby boom. Figures released last month show that the country’s
birthrate fell by 3.5 percent in 2017 compared with the previous
year. (The number of births had increased in 2016, the first year since the
policy shift, though far less than the government had hoped.) According to
official statistics, the number of children born to parents who already had one
child did rise in 2017, but the number of first-child births dropped.
has been no baby boom. Figures released last month show that the country’s
birthrate fell by 3.5 percent in 2017 compared with the previous
year. (The number of births had increased in 2016, the first year since the
policy shift, though far less than the government had hoped.) According to
official statistics, the number of children born to parents who already had one
child did rise in 2017, but the number of first-child births dropped.
Why?
Because a critical mass of women appears to be in no rush to have babies, particularly
urban, educated women — just the category that the C.C.P. is
counting on to produce and raise a new generation of skilled, knowledge-based
workers.
Because a critical mass of women appears to be in no rush to have babies, particularly
urban, educated women — just the category that the C.C.P. is
counting on to produce and raise a new generation of skilled, knowledge-based
workers.
While the
one-child policy was in place, from 1979 to
2015, the government forced many women to have abortions or undergo
other invasive birth-control procedures. Since its recent policy U-turn, it has
deployed the same zeal to extol the glories of having more children — and the
sooner, the better.
one-child policy was in place, from 1979 to
2015, the government forced many women to have abortions or undergo
other invasive birth-control procedures. Since its recent policy U-turn, it has
deployed the same zeal to extol the glories of having more children — and the
sooner, the better.
The
government has unleashed in recent years a propaganda blitz on women it
considers to be gao suzhi, or of “high quality.” “Make sure you
don’t miss out on women’s best years for getting pregnant!” warn
some headlines in state media. Those years supposedly are between the ages of
24 and 29, according to the government; beyond that, it says, beware birth
defects.
government has unleashed in recent years a propaganda blitz on women it
considers to be gao suzhi, or of “high quality.” “Make sure you
don’t miss out on women’s best years for getting pregnant!” warn
some headlines in state media. Those years supposedly are between the ages of
24 and 29, according to the government; beyond that, it says, beware birth
defects.
One-child
policy, two-child policy — whatever the demographic program, the C.C.P.
continues to view women as the reproductive agents of the state, as instruments
of implementation for its eugenic development agenda.
The
latest campaign takes special aim at the educated. An article originally
published in December 2015 in the Beijing Youth Daily, the official publication
of the Communist Youth League, urged female students to have babies — and featured a photo of the
blacked-out silhouette of a woman in university-graduation gown and
mortarboard, holding an infant (in full color). It has been widely reprinted,
under peppy headlines like “University in Beijing has over 10 female student
mothers: Bright job prospects” (The People’s
Daily Online) and “ ‘Already had a baby’ becomes a sought-after
quality in the job-hunting season — more female university students prepare for
pregnancy” (sohu.com). Another article on sohu.com,
a popular website that runs state-media reports, played up the romance of
having children early: “Female university student’s joyful love: freshman year
— live together, sophomore year — get pregnant, junior year — have baby.”
latest campaign takes special aim at the educated. An article originally
published in December 2015 in the Beijing Youth Daily, the official publication
of the Communist Youth League, urged female students to have babies — and featured a photo of the
blacked-out silhouette of a woman in university-graduation gown and
mortarboard, holding an infant (in full color). It has been widely reprinted,
under peppy headlines like “University in Beijing has over 10 female student
mothers: Bright job prospects” (The People’s
Daily Online) and “ ‘Already had a baby’ becomes a sought-after
quality in the job-hunting season — more female university students prepare for
pregnancy” (sohu.com). Another article on sohu.com,
a popular website that runs state-media reports, played up the romance of
having children early: “Female university student’s joyful love: freshman year
— live together, sophomore year — get pregnant, junior year — have baby.”
At the
same time, the government discourages unmarried women from having babies — by
way of fines and administrative hurdles — because it sees marriage and family
as a pillar of
social stability. As far back as 2007, it was trying to stigmatize
women who remained single after the age of 27, calling them sheng nu, “leftover”
women. Today, it is expanding official matchmaking initiatives. The Communist
Youth League organizes mass blind dates across the country while
teaching young people what it calls “the correct attitude”
toward love and marriage.
same time, the government discourages unmarried women from having babies — by
way of fines and administrative hurdles — because it sees marriage and family
as a pillar of
social stability. As far back as 2007, it was trying to stigmatize
women who remained single after the age of 27, calling them sheng nu, “leftover”
women. Today, it is expanding official matchmaking initiatives. The Communist
Youth League organizes mass blind dates across the country while
teaching young people what it calls “the correct attitude”
toward love and marriage.
The
approach’s eugenic undertones are unmistakable. Even as officials urge
college-educated, Han Chinese women to marry and get pregnant, they are
discouraging, sometimes through coercion, ethnic minorities with high
birthrates — particularly Uighurs in the northwestern region of Xinjiang — from
having more children. Last summer, government officials invoked “ethnic
equality” to announce the end of a longstanding exception that had
allowed Uighurs and other groups to have one more child than families from the
Han majority.
approach’s eugenic undertones are unmistakable. Even as officials urge
college-educated, Han Chinese women to marry and get pregnant, they are
discouraging, sometimes through coercion, ethnic minorities with high
birthrates — particularly Uighurs in the northwestern region of Xinjiang — from
having more children. Last summer, government officials invoked “ethnic
equality” to announce the end of a longstanding exception that had
allowed Uighurs and other groups to have one more child than families from the
Han majority.
But
people aren’t responding to the new policy as the government had hoped.
people aren’t responding to the new policy as the government had hoped.
Many Han
women, for example, are pushing back against the government’s singles-shaming
and its continued attempt at reproductive social engineering.
women, for example, are pushing back against the government’s singles-shaming
and its continued attempt at reproductive social engineering.
The figures
released last month by the National Bureau of Statistics do not
provide a breakdown comparing, say, urban and rural birthrates, but polls and
anecdotal information are revealing. In a May 2017
survey of more than 40,000 working women by Zhaopin, one of China’s
largest online recruitment websites, about 40 percent of respondents who had no
children said they did not want to have any, and nearly 63 percent of working
mothers with one child said they did not want to have another one. The women
surveyed said that the main reasons for these positions were lack of time and
energy, the expense of raising children and “concerns over career development.”
released last month by the National Bureau of Statistics do not
provide a breakdown comparing, say, urban and rural birthrates, but polls and
anecdotal information are revealing. In a May 2017
survey of more than 40,000 working women by Zhaopin, one of China’s
largest online recruitment websites, about 40 percent of respondents who had no
children said they did not want to have any, and nearly 63 percent of working
mothers with one child said they did not want to have another one. The women
surveyed said that the main reasons for these positions were lack of time and
energy, the expense of raising children and “concerns over career development.”
The
implications of such findings are potentially staggering, considering the speed
at which China’s middle class is growing. In 2016, the Economist Intelligence
Unit estimated that the number of Chinese belonging to upper-middle-income or
high-income brackets, which reached 132 million (or 10 percent of the
population) in 2015, would rise to 480 million (and 35 percent of the
population) by 2030.
implications of such findings are potentially staggering, considering the speed
at which China’s middle class is growing. In 2016, the Economist Intelligence
Unit estimated that the number of Chinese belonging to upper-middle-income or
high-income brackets, which reached 132 million (or 10 percent of the
population) in 2015, would rise to 480 million (and 35 percent of the
population) by 2030.
In other
words, China’s latest family-planning policies aren’t just another violation of
women’s rights; they are also an ineffectual means of promoting the
government’s population-growth agenda. And so, even going by its own logic, the
C.C.P. should abandon these measures.
words, China’s latest family-planning policies aren’t just another violation of
women’s rights; they are also an ineffectual means of promoting the
government’s population-growth agenda. And so, even going by its own logic, the
C.C.P. should abandon these measures.
